Related papers: Small One-Dimensional Euclidean Preference Profile…

We consider one-dimensional biased voter models, where 1's replace 0's at a faster rate than the other way round, started in a Heaviside initial state describing the interface between two infinite populations of 0's and 1's. In the limit of…

We solve the problem of one-dimensional peg solitaire. In particular, we show that the set of configurations that can be reduced to a single peg forms a regular language, and that a linear-time algorithm exists for reducing any…

Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets…

Kurz and Napel (2015) proved that the voting system of the EU council (based on the 2014 population data) cannot be represented as the intersection of six weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This set a new record for…

We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to…

A finite set of the Euclidean space is called an $s$-distance set provided the number of Euclidean distances in the set is $s$. Determining the largest possible $s$-distance set for the Euclidean space of a given dimension is challenging.…

We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…

We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function f of $q \ge 4$ alternatives and n voters will be manipulable with probability at least…

Given a set $A$ of $n$ people and a set $B$ of $m \geq n$ items, with each person having a list that ranks his/her preferred items in order of preference, we want to match every person with a unique item. A matching $M$ is called popular if…

We obtain several formulas for the Euclidean distance degree (ED degree) of an arbitrary nonsingular variety in projective space: in terms of Chern and Segre classes, Milnor classes, Chern-Schwartz-MacPherson classes, and an extremely…

We show that Euclidean geometry in suitably high dimension can be expressed as a theory of orthogonality of subspaces with fixed dimensions and fixed dimension of their meet.

Given $n$ men, $n$ women, and $n$ dogs, we assume that each man has a complete preference list of women, while each woman does a complete preference list of dogs, and each dog does a complete preference list of men. We study the so-called…

We define the regular Euclidean algorithm and the general form which leads to the method of least absolute remainders and also the method of negative remainders. We are going to show that if looked from the perspective of subtraction, the…

The unit Euclidean distance degree and the generic Euclidean distance degree are two well-studied invariants of projective varieties. These quantities measure the algebraic complexity of nearest-point problems on a variety, and in many…

Scalable frames are frames with the property that the frame vectors can be rescaled resulting in tight frames. However, if a frame is not scalable, one has to aim for an approximate procedure. For this, in this paper we introduce three…

Distributed voting is a fundamental topic in distributed computing. In pull voting, in each step every vertex chooses a neighbour uniformly at random, and adopts its opinion. The voting is completed when all vertices hold the same opinion.…

We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…

Pull voting is a random process in which vertices of a connected graph have initial opinions chosen from a set of $k$ distinct opinions, and at each step a random vertex alters its opinion to that of a randomly chosen neighbour. If the…

We consider a network in the Euclidean plane that consists of three distinct half-lines with common start points. From that network as initial condition, there exists a network that consists of three curves that all start at one point,…

Let K be a simplicial complex with vertex set V = {v_1,..., v_n}. The complex K is d-representable if there is a collection {C_1,...,C_n} of convex sets in R^d such that a subcollection {C_{i_1},...,C_{i_j}} has a nonempty intersection if…