Related papers: Small One-Dimensional Euclidean Preference Profile…
We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter. We consider…
This mini-review presents extensions of the voter model that incorporate various plausible features of real decision-making processes by individuals. Although these generalizations are not calibrated by empirical data, the resulting…
We investigate (quantifier-free) spatial constraint languages with equality, contact and connectedness predicates as well as Boolean operations on regions, interpreted over low-dimensional Euclidean spaces. We show that the complexity of…
We consider a four-player game on the discrete hypercube $Q_n = \{0,1\}^n$, where each of the four players has chosen a single vertex of the hypercube. Such a position is called a profile. Imagine there is a voter at every vertex, and each…
In multiagent systems, we often have a set of agents each of which have a preference ordering over a set of items and one would like to know these preference orderings for various tasks, for example, data analysis, preference aggregation,…
Let H be a closed half-space of n-dimensional Euclidean space. Suppose S is a unit sphere in H that touches the supporting hyperplane of H. The one-sided kissing number B(n) is the maximal number of unit nonoverlapping spheres in H that can…
In this paper we consider the isoperimetric problem with double density in an Euclidean space, that is, we study the minimisation of the perimeter among subsets of $\mathbb{R}^n$ with fixed volume, where volume and perimeter are relative to…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…
In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules--SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin--Courant, and HarmonicBorda--for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three…
It is natural to expect that there are only three possible types of scaling limits for the collection of all percolation interfaces in the plane: (1) a trivial one, consisting of no curves at all, (2) a critical one, in which all points of…
Topological descriptors, such as the Euler characteristic function and the persistence diagram, have grown increasingly popular for representing complex data. Recent work showed that a carefully chosen set of these descriptors encodes all…
Studying and understanding social networks is crucial for accurately defining ideological polarization, since they enable precise modeling of social structures. One of the limitations of many methods for quantifying polarization on networks…
We propose a class of semimetrics for preference relations any one of which is an alternative to the classical Kemeny-Snell-Bogart metric. (We take a fairly general viewpoint about what constitutes a preference relation, allowing for any…
It is verified that the number of vertices in a $d$-dimensional cubical pseudomanifold is at least $2^{d+1}$. Using Adin's cubical $h$-vector, the generalized lower bound conjecture is established for all cubical 4-spheres, as well as for…
Our main contribution is the introduction of the map of elections framework. A map of elections consists of three main elements: (1) a dataset of elections (i.e., collections of ordinal votes over given sets of candidates), (2) a way of…
Our main contribution is the introduction of the map of elections framework. A map of elections consists of three main elements: (1) a dataset of elections (i.e., collections of ordinal votes over given sets of candidates), (2) a way of…
We analyze the structure of the disagreement among a population of voters over a set of alternatives. Surveys typically ask either for pairwise comparisons, simple and intuitive for participants, or full rankings over alternatives,…
Most social choice rules assume access to full rankings, while current alignment practice -- despite aiming for diversity -- typically treats voters as anonymous and comparisons as independent, effectively extracting only about one bit per…