Related papers: Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constra…
We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problem (MTRA) with partial preferences. In our setting, there…
House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents.…
This paper establishes non-asymptotic convergence of the cutoffs in Random serial dictatorship in an environment with many students, many schools, and arbitrary student preferences. Convergence is shown to hold when the number of schools,…
This paper considers a distributed multi-agent optimization problem, with the global objective consisting of the sum of local objective functions of the agents. The agents solve the optimization problem using local computation and…
Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in multiagent systems, and envy-freeness is among the most compelling fairness concepts. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of any other…
We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of monetary transfers, Pareto efficient and truthful rules are…
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize…
We introduce a novel family of mechanisms for constrained allocation problems which we call local priority mechanisms. These mechanisms are parameterized by a function which assigns a set of agents, the local compromisers, to every…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
Course assignment is a wide-spread problem in education and beyond. Often students have preferences for bundles of course seats or course schedules over the week, which need to be considered. The problem is a challenging distributed…
We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful…
We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness), Pareto…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximize fairness and efficiency. Achieving any non-trivial…
We initiate the study of parallel algorithms for fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive preferences. We give fast parallel algorithms for various fundamental problems, such as finding a Pareto Optimal and EF1…
This thesis is concerned with distributed control and coordination of networks consisting of multiple, potentially mobile, agents. This is motivated mainly by the emergence of large scale networks characterized by the lack of centralized…
This work develops effective distributed strategies for the solution of constrained multi-agent stochastic optimization problems with coupled parameters across the agents. In this formulation, each agent is influenced by only a subset of…
Finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible resources to agents is a central task in many multiagent systems. Often, non-trivial envy-free allocations do not exist, and, when they do, finding them can be computationally hard. Classical…
We investigate the tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency when allocating indivisible items over time. Suppose T items arrive over time and must be allocated upon arrival, immediately and irrevocably, to one of n agents. Agent i assigns…
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…