Related papers: Indirect Mechanism Design for Efficient and Stable…
A bargaining game is investigated for cooperative energy management in microgrids. This game incorporates a fully distributed and realistic cooperative power scheduling algorithm (CoDES) as well as a distributed Nash Bargaining Solution…
We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…
Noncooperative game-theoretic tools have been increasingly used to study many important resource allocation problems in communications, networking, smart grids, and portfolio optimization. In this paper, we consider a general class of…
Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…
High shares of variable renewable energy necessitate substantial energy storage capacity. However, it remains unclear how to design a market that, on the one hand, ensures a stable and sufficient income for storage firms, and, on the other…
In this paper, the problem of smart grid energy management under stochastic dynamics is investigated. In the considered model, at the demand side, it is assumed that customers can act as prosumers who own renewable energy sources and can…
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
Forecast reconciliation is considered an effective method to achieve coherence (within a forecast hierarchy) and to improve forecast quality. However, the value of reconciled forecasts in downstream decision-making tasks has been mostly…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…
A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to grasp…
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive…
Owing to the fluctuant renewable generation and power demand, the energy surplus or deficit in each nanogrid is embodied differently across time. To stimulate local renewable energy consumption and minimize the long-term energy cost, some…
We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…
We propose an operating envelopes (OEs) aware energy community market mechanism that dynamically charges/rewards its members based on two-part pricing. The OEs are imposed exogenously by a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) on the…
We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…