Related papers: Mathematical models for stable matching problems w…
We study a variation of the Stable Marriage problem, where every man and every woman express their preferences as preference lists which may be incomplete and contain ties. This problem is called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and…
The classical Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) models the assignment of junior doctors to hospitals based on their preferences over one another. In an instance of this problem, a stable matching M is sought which ensures that no blocking…
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n…
The stable marriage problem with incomplete lists and ties (SMTI) and the hospitals/residents problem with ties (HRT) are important in matching theory with broad practical applications. In this paper, we introduce a tie-breaking based local…
We study parameterized approximability of three optimization problems related to stable matching: (1) Min-BP-SMI: Given a stable marriage instance and a number k, find a size-at-least-k matching that minimizes the number $\beta$ of blocking…
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) models the allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. It is…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…
In the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), a set of $2n$ agents rank one another in a linear order. The goal is to find a matching that is stable: one that has no pair of agents who mutually prefer each other over their assigned partners. We…
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Resident problem (HR) that is important in practical applications because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists…
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…
We apply Lattice-Linear Predicate Detection Technique to derive parallel and distributed algorithms for various variants of the stable matching problem. These problems are: (a) the constrained stable marriage problem (b) the super stable…
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…
Finding a stable matching is one of the central problems in algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties and incomplete preferences, computing a stable matching of maximum cardinality is known to be NP-hard. In this…
Motivated by the serious problem that hospitals in rural areas suffer from a shortage of residents, we study the Hospitals/Residents model in which hospitals are associated with lower quotas and the objective is to satisfy them as much as…
In the stable marriage problem (SM), a mechanism that always outputs a stable matching is called a stable mechanism. One of the well-known stable mechanisms is the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm (MGS). MGS has a good property that it…
We study integer linear programs (ILP) of the form $\min\{c^\top x\ \vert\ Ax=b,l\le x\le u,x\in\mathbb Z^n\}$ and analyze their parameterized complexity with respect to their distance to the generalized matching problem, following the…
In this paper, we study the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC), where a solution is a stable matching or a report that none exists. We present a novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with preferences over Projects (SPA-P) involves sets of students, projects and lecturers, where the students and lecturers each have preferences over the projects. In this context, we typically seek a…
Sequential algorithms for the Stable Matching Problem are often too slow in the context of some large scale applications like switch scheduling. Parallel architectures can offer a notable decrease in runtime complexity. We propose a stable…
We introduce an extension of decision problems called resiliency problems. In resiliency problems, the goal is to decide whether an instance remains positive after any (appropriately defined) perturbation has been applied to it. To tackle…