Related papers: Auction Theory Adaptations for Real Life Applicati…
This paper discusses the connection between mathematical finance and statistical modelling which turns out to be more than a formal mathematical correspondence. We like to figure out how common results and notions in statistics and their…
The geometric and algebraic theory of valuations on cones is applied to understand identities involving summing certain rational functions over the set of linear extensions of a poset.
This paper studies mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets, a novel setting where the budgets that bidders commit are adjusted due to the externality of the competitors' allocation outcomes-a departure from traditional…
There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling goods to selfish bidders. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared against a benchmark (such as, the maximum revenue obtainable by…
In [1] we presented a model for transactions when goods are given away in the expectation of a later settlement. In settings where people keep track of their social accounts we were able to redefine concepts like account balance, yield…
We outline how modern likelihood theory, which provides essentially exact inferences in a variety of parametric statistical problems, may routinely be applied in practice. Although the likelihood procedures are based on analytical…
We develop an extension of valuations theorem for suitable extensions of idempotent semirings. As an application, we give a new proof for the classical case of fields. Along the way, we develop characteristic one analogues of some central…
We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences follow the maxmin expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs close to the seller's belief, where "closeness" is defined by a…
Among the existing E-Commerce applications, online auctions are the most influential ones. Their impact on trading in the B2B (business to business) as well as in the B2C (business to consumer) and C2C (consumer to consumer) areas will be…
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total…
Auctions are key for maximizing sellers' revenue and ensuring truthful bidding among buyers. Recently, an approach known as differentiable economics based on machine learning (ML) has shown promise in learning powerful auction mechanisms…
In auction theory, cryptography has been used to achieve anonymity of the participants, security and privacy of the bids, secure computation and to simulate mediator (auctioneer). Auction theory focuses on revenue and Cryptography focuses…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al.…
In general it is not clear which kind of information is supposed to be used for calculating the fair value of a contingent claim. Even if the information is specified, it is not guaranteed that the fair value is uniquely determined by the…
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the…
We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible…
We use formal methods to specify, design, and monitor continuous double auctions, which are widely used to match buyers and sellers at exchanges of foreign currencies, stocks, and commodities. We identify three natural properties of such…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
Two general algorithms based on opportunity costs are given for approximating a revenue-maximizing set of bids an auctioneer should accept, in a combinatorial auction in which each bidder offers a price for some subset of the available…
Models to price long term loans in the securities lending business are developed. These longer horizon deals can be viewed as contracts with optionality embedded in them. This insight leads to the usage of established methods from…