Related papers: Optimizing a Generalized Gini Index in Stable Marr…
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). In particular, we seek stable matchings that are optimal with respect to profile, which is a vector that indicates the…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…
In this paper, we consider the communication complexity of protocols that compute stable matchings. We work within the context of Gale and Shapley's original stable marriage problem\cite{GS62}: $n$ men and $n$ women each privately hold a…
Gini index is a widely used measure of economic inequality. This article develops a general theory for constructing a confidence interval for Gini index with a specified confidence coefficient and a specified width. Fixed sample size…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…
We present an n-ary constraint for the stable marriage problem. This constraint acts between two sets of integer variables where the domains of those variables represent preferences. Our constraint enforces stability and disallows bigamy.…
We consider a general class of combinatorial optimization problems including among others allocation, multiple knapsack, matching or travelling salesman problems. The standard version of those problems is the maximum weight optimization…
The inequality is computed through the so-called Gini index. The population is assumed to have the variable of interest distributed according to the Gamma probability distribution. The results show that the Gini index is reduced when the…
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…
Finding schedules for pairwise meetings between the members of a complex social group without creating interpersonal conflict is challenging, especially when different relationships have different needs. We formally define and study the…
In the stable marriage problem (SM), a mechanism that always outputs a stable matching is called a stable mechanism. One of the well-known stable mechanisms is the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm (MGS). MGS has a good property that it…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…