Related papers: Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
The Kidney Exchange Problem is a prominent challenge in healthcare and economics, arising in the context of organ transplantation. It has been extensively studied in artificial intelligence and optimization. In a kidney exchange, a set of…
We study the performance of general dynamic matching models. This model is defined by a connected graph, where nodes represent the class of items and the edges the compatibilities between items. Items of different classes arrive one by one…
Designing spatial networks, such as transport networks, commonly deals with the problem of how to best connect a set of locations through a set of links. In practice, it can be crucial to order the implementation of the links in a way that…
A major problem in data augmentation is to ensure that the generated new samples cover the search space. This is a challenging problem and requires exploration for data augmentation policies to ensure their effectiveness in covering the…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
Rising provider turnover results in frequently needing to rematch patients with available providers. However, the rematching process is cumbersome for both patients and health systems, resulting in labor-intensive and ad hoc reassignments.…
We study the greedy-based online algorithm for edge-weighted matching with (one-sided) vertex arrivals in bipartite graphs, and edge arrivals in general graphs. This algorithm was first studied more than a decade ago by Korula and P\'al for…
We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with $n$ doctors and $n$ hospitals, the…
Romantic courtship is often described as taking place in a dating market where men and women compete for mates, but the detailed structure and dynamics of dating markets have historically been difficult to quantify for lack of suitable…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…
The kinetic exchange model has gained popularity in the field of statistical mechanics for investigating wealth interaction. Traditionally, kinetic exchange models have been studied without considering preferential interactions. However, in…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…
Sequential fundraising in two sided online platforms enable peer to peer lending by sequentially bringing potential contributors, each of whose decisions impact other contributors in the market. However, understanding the dynamics of…
We investigate a market without money in which agents can offer certain goods (or multiple copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange must be balanced in the sense that each agent should receive a…
This paper studies the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a two-sided market in which agents behave strategically and trade according to the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. By assuming that altruistic agents have concerns for others on the…
A kidney exchange is a centrally-administered barter market where patients swap their willing yet incompatible donors. Modern kidney exchanges use 2-cycles, 3-cycles, and chains initiated by non-directed donors (altruists who are willing to…
Optical focusing through scattering media has important implications for optical applications in medicine, communications, and detection. In recent years, many wavefront shaping methods have been successfully applied to the field, among…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…