Related papers: Constrained Existence Problem for Weak Subgame Per…
We study games with reachability objectives under energy constraints. We first prove that under strict energy constraints (either only lower-bound constraint or interval constraint), those games are LOGSPACE-equivalent to energy games with…
In this work, we provide a structural characterization of the possible Nash equilibria in the well-studied class of security games with additive utility. Our analysis yields a classification of possible equilibria into seven types and we…
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well…
We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework,…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
This paper concerns with an existence of a solution for a single leader multi-follower game (SLMFG), where the followers jointly solve an abstract economy problem. Recall that an abstract economy problem is an extension of a generalized…
We study turn-based stochastic zero-sum games with lexicographic preferences over reachability and safety objectives. Stochastic games are standard models in control, verification, and synthesis of stochastic reactive systems that exhibit…
We provide a complete characterization for the computational complexity of finding approximate equilibria in two-action graphical games. We consider the two most well-studied approximation notions: $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…
While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…
Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
We consider a weighted Shapley network design game, where selfish players choose paths in a network to minimize their cost. The cost function of each edge in the network is affine linear with respect to the sum of weights of the players who…
In this paper, we study infinite-horizon linear-quadratic uncertain differential games with an output feedback information structure. We assume linear time-invariant nominal dynamics influenced by deterministic external disturbances, and…
In this paper, we consider a continuous-type Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in subnetwork zero-sum games, which is a generalization of deterministic subnetwork zero-sum games and discrete-type Bayesian zero-sum games. In…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
We conjecture that PPAD has a PCP-like complete problem, seeking a near equilibrium in which all but very few players have very little incentive to deviate. We show that, if one assumes that this problem requires exponential time, several…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…
The equilibrium selection problem in the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) has recently been studied as an optimization problem, defined over the set of all variational equilibria achievable through a lower-level non-cooperative…