Related papers: Dynamic Bayesian Games for Adversarial and Defensi…
This paper explores coordinated deception strategies by synchronizing defenses across coupled cyber and physical systems to mislead attackers and strengthen defense mechanisms. We introduce a Stackelberg game framework to model the…
Cognitive vulnerabilities shape human decision-making and arise primarily from two sources: (1) cognitive capabilities, which include disparities in knowledge, education, expertise, or access to information, and (2) cognitive biases, such…
Securing dynamic networks against adversarial actions is challenging because of the need to anticipate and counter strategic disruptions by adversarial entities within complex network structures. Traditional game-theoretic models, while…
The advent of online genomic data-sharing services has sought to enhance the accessibility of large genomic datasets by allowing queries about genetic variants, such as summary statistics, aiding care providers in distinguishing between…
We study a binary hypothesis testing problem in which a defender must decide whether or not a test sequence has been drawn from a given memoryless source $P_0$ whereas, an attacker strives to impede the correct detection. With respect to…
The growing complexity and interconnectivity of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) make them increasingly vulnerable to advanced cyber threats, particularly deceptive information attacks. These sophisticated threats exploit…
Cyber deception is an emerging proactive defense strategy to counter increasingly sophisticated attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) by misleading and distracting attackers from critical assets. However, since deception…
Cyber-deception is an increasingly important defensive strategy, shaping adversarial decision making through controlled misinformation, uncertainty, and misdirection. Although game-theoretic, Bayesian, Markov decision process, and…
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to networked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies aim to create and exploit…
We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…
We consider a game in which a strategic defender classifies an intruder as spy or spammer. The classification is based on the number of file server and mail server attacks observed during a fixed window. The spammer naively attacks (with a…
Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…
A significant limitation of current cyber security research and techniques is its reactive and applied nature. This leads to a continuous 'cyber cycle' of attackers scanning networks, developing exploits and attacking systems, with…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
Strategic deception is an act of manipulating the opponent's perception to gain strategic advantages. In this paper, we study synthesis of deceptive winning strategies in two-player turn-based zero-sum reachability games on graphs with…
We propose interdependent defense (IDD) games, a computational game-theoretic framework to study aspects of the interdependence of risk and security in multi-agent systems under deliberate external attacks. Our model builds upon…
The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her limited resources to defend critical targets and the attacker…
Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model where each player's type parameter characterizing its own objective is private information: each player knows its own type but not its rivals' types, and Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is…
Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game…
Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game…