Related papers: Simple property of heterogeneous aspiration dynami…
In this work we study a weak Prisoner\^as Dilemma game in which both strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure. Interactions among agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider both homogeneous and…
Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…
The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…
This paper demonstrates that simple yet important characteristics of coevolution can occur in evolutionary algorithms when only a few conditions are met. We find that interaction-based fitness measurements such as fitness (linear) ranking…
In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly-heterogeneous spatial structures. As a result, one of the most difficult…
We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…
We study the performance of different methods for processing information, incorporating narrative selection within an evolutionary model. All agents update their beliefs according to Bayes' Rule, but some strategically choose the narrative…
As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do not respond…
We present a stylized model with feedback loops for the evolution of a population's wealth over generations. Individuals have both talent and wealth: talent is a random variable distributed identically for everyone, but wealth is a random…
Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. Recent work stimulated by the discovery of "zero-determinant" strategies has rapidly expanded our ability to analyze such interactions. This…
Evolutionary systems must learn to generalize, often extrapolating from a limited set of selective conditions to anticipate future environmental changes. The mechanisms enabling such generalization remain poorly understood, despite their…
When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…
Institutions and cultures evolve adaptively in response to the current environmental incentives, usually. But sometimes institutional change is due to stochastic drives beyond current fitness, including drift, path dependency, blind…
Configurational arrangement of network architecture and interaction character of individuals are two most influential factors on the mechanisms underlying the evolutionary outcome of cooperation, which is explained by the well-established…
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…
In nature and human societies, the effects of homogeneous and heterogeneous characteristics on the evolution of collective behaviors are quite different from each other. It is of great importance to understand the underlying mechanisms of…
The dynamics of herd immunity depend crucially on the interaction between collective social behavior and disease transmission, but the role of heterogeneity in this context frequently remains unclear. Here, we dissect this co-evolutionary…
In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by the personal features. Now we investigate how an artificially imposed restricted ability to reproduce, overruling ones fitness, affects an…