Related papers: Routing for Traffic Networks with Mixed Autonomy
We study routing behavior in transportation networks with mixed autonomy, that is, networks in which a fraction of the vehicles on each road are equipped with autonomous capabilities such as adaptive cruise control that enable reduced…
Among the many functions a Smart City must support, transportation dominates in terms of resource consumption, strain on the environment, and frustration of its citizens. We study transportation networks under two different routing…
Traffic congestion has large economic and social costs. The introduction of autonomous vehicles can potentially reduce this congestion by increasing road capacity via vehicle platooning and by creating an avenue for influencing people's…
We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…
Autonomous vehicles have the potential to increase the capacity of roads via platooning, even when human drivers and autonomous vehicles share roads. However, when users of a road network choose their routes selfishly, the resulting traffic…
In congestion games, selfish users behave myopically to crowd to the shortest paths, and the social planner designs mechanisms to regulate such selfish routing through information or payment incentives. However, such mechanism design…
Route controlled autonomous vehicles could have a significant impact in reducing congestion in the future. Before applying multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms to route control, we can model the system using a congestion game to…
Traffic congestion has large economic and social costs. The introduction of autonomous vehicles can potentially reduce this congestion, both by increasing network throughput and by enabling a social planner to incentivize users of…
The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…
When selfish users share a road network and minimize their individual travel costs, the equilibrium they reach can be worse than the socially optimal routing. Tolls are often used to mitigate this effect in traditional congestion games,…
The congestion pricing is an efficient allocation approach to mediate demand and supply of network resources. Different from the previous pricing using Affine Marginal Cost (AMC), we focus on studying the game between network coding and…
With autonomous vehicles now sharing roads with human drivers, the era of mixed autonomy brings new challenges in dealing with congestion. One cause of congestion is when vehicle users choose their routes selfishly to minimize their…
When many independent users try to route traffic through a network, the flow can easily become suboptimal as a consequence of congestion of the most efficient paths. The degree of this suboptimality is quantified by the so-called "price of…
Road congestion induces significant costs across the world, and road network disturbances, such as traffic accidents, can cause highly congested traffic patterns. If a planner had control over the routing of all vehicles in the network,…
In a traffic network, vehicles normally select their routes selfishly. Consequently, traffic networks normally operate at an equilibrium characterized by Wardrop conditions. However, it is well known that equilibria are inefficient in…
It is known that connected and autonomous vehicles are capable of maintaining shorter headways and distances when they form platoons of vehicles. Thus, such technologies can result in increases in the capacities of traffic networks.…
The emerging technology enabling autonomy in vehicles has led to a variety of new problems in transportation networks, such as planning and perception for autonomous vehicles. Other works consider social objectives such as decreasing fuel…
We investigate a traffic assignment problem on a transportation network, considering both the demands of individual drivers and of a large fleet controlled by a central operator (minimizing the fleet's average travel time). We formulate…
Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often…
When people pick routes to minimize their travel time, the total experienced delay, or social cost, may be significantly greater than if people followed routes assigned to them by a social planner. This effect is accentuated when human…