Related papers: Data-Driven Debugging for Functional Side Channels

Debugging is an unavoidable and most crucial aspect of software development life cycle. Especially when it comes the turn of embedded one. Due to the requirements of low code size and less resource consumption, the embedded softwares need…

Recent work on Side Channel Analysis (SCA) targets old, well-known vulnerabilities, even previously exploited, reported, and patched in high-profile cryptography libraries. Nevertheless, researchers continue to find and exploit the same…

In this work, we study information leakage in timing side channels that arise in the context of shared event schedulers. Consider two processes, one of them an innocuous process (referred to as Alice) and the other a malicious one (referred…

Protecting sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure is a major concern of every organization. As an organizations employees need to access such information in order to carry out their daily work, data leakage detection is both an…

Last-level cache side-channel attacks have been mostly demonstrated in highly-controlled, quiescent local environments. Hence, it is unclear whether such attacks are feasible in a production cloud environment. In the cloud, side channels…

Leaking information about the execution behavior of critical real-time tasks may lead to serious consequences, including violations of temporal constraints and even severe failures. We study information leakage for a special class of…

Deletion is a fundamental database operation, yet modern systems often fail to provide the privacy guarantee that users expect from it. A deleted value may disappear from query results and even from physical storage, yet remain inferable…

The widespread adoption of encryption in network protocols has significantly improved the overall security of many Internet applications. However, these protocols cannot prevent network side-channel leaks -- leaks of sensitive information…

Formal verification of cryptographic protocols typically relies on symbolic models that abstract away compiled code and microarchitectural side channels, leaving a gap between verified specifications and deployed executables. We present a…

Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…

Deployed large language models (LLMs) often rely on speculative decoding, a technique that generates and verifies multiple candidate tokens in parallel, to improve throughput and latency. In this work, we reveal a new side-channel whereby…

In this work, we identify a set of side-channels in our Confidential Federated Compute platform that a hypothetical insider could exploit to circumvent differential privacy (DP) guarantees. We show how DP can mitigate two of the…

Detecting covert channels among legitimate traffic represents a severe challenge due to the high heterogeneity of networks. Therefore, we propose an effective covert channel detection method, based on the analysis of DNS network data…

Many software projects employ manual code review to gatekeep defects and vulnerabilities in the code before integration. However, reviewers often work under time pressure and rely primarily on static inspection, leaving the dynamic aspects…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…

The code generation modules inside modern compilers such as GCC and LLVM, which use a limited number of CPU registers to store a large number of program variables, may introduce side-channel leaks even in software equipped with…

Protecting the confidentiality of private data and using it for useful collaboration have long been at odds. Modern cryptography is bridging this gap through rapid growth in secure protocols such as multi-party computation,…

In the last years, a series of side channels have been discovered on CPUs. These side channels have been used in powerful attacks, e.g., on cryptographic implementations, or as building blocks in transient-execution attacks such as Spectre…

Preventing implicit information flows by dynamic program analysis requires coarse approximations that result in false positives, because a dynamic monitor sees only the executed trace of the program. One widely deployed method is the…

Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…