Related papers: Data-Driven Debugging for Functional Side Channels
This paper presents Packet Chasing, an attack on the network that does not require access to the network, and works regardless of the privilege level of the process receiving the packets. A spy process can easily probe and discover the…
This paper presents a practical side-channel attack that identifies the social web service account of a visitor to an attacker's website. Our attack leverages the widely adopted user-blocking mechanism, abusing its inherent property that…
Side-channel attacks have become prominent attack surfaces in cyberspace. Attackers use the side information generated by the system while performing a task. Among the various side-channel attacks, cache side-channel attacks are leading as…
The wide deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has given rise to strong demands for optimizing their inference performance. Today's techniques serving this purpose primarily focus on reducing latency and improving throughput through…
Machine learning on encrypted data has received a lot of attention thanks to recent breakthroughs in homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation. It allows outsourcing computation to untrusted servers without sacrificing…
Information flow analysis prevents secret or untrusted data from flowing into public or trusted sinks. Existing mechanisms cover a wide array of options, ranging from lightweight taint analysis to heavyweight information flow control that…
Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the…
Realizing flow security in a concurrent environment is extremely challenging, primarily due to non-deterministic nature of execution. The difficulty is further exacerbated from a security angle if sequential threads disclose control…
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The page cache is a pure software cache that contains all…
Timing attacks are considered one of the most damaging side-channel attacks. These attacks exploit timing fluctuations caused by certain operations to disclose confidential information to an attacker. For instance, in asymmetric encryption,…
The JavaScript programming language, which began as a simple scripting language for the Web, has become ubiquitous, spanning desktop, mobile, and server applications. This increase in usage has made JavaScript an attractive target for…
Consider $L$ users, who each hold private data, and one fusion center who must compute a function of the private data of the $L$ users. To accomplish this task, each user may utilize a public and noiseless broadcast channel in a…
The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between the fast CPU and the slowmemory, may reveal sensitive information of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting…
Public development processes are a key characteristic of open source projects. However, fixes for vulnerabilities are usually discussed privately among a small group of trusted maintainers, and integrated without prior public involvement.…
Timing side channels in two-user schedulers are studied. When two users share a scheduler, one user may learn the other user's behavior from patterns of service timings. We measure the information leakage of the resulting timing side…
Recent research shows that colluded malware in different VMs sharing a single physical host may use a resource as a channel to leak critical information. Covert channels employ time or storage characteristics to transmit confidential…
Cache-based side channels enable a dedicated attacker to reveal program secrets by measuring the cache access patterns. Practical attacks have been shown against real-world crypto algorithm implementations such as RSA, AES, and ElGamal. By…
Most current approaches for protecting privacy in machine learning (ML) assume that models exist in a vacuum. Yet, in reality, these models are part of larger systems that include components for training data filtering, output monitoring,…
Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…
Supervised deep learning has emerged as an effective tool for carrying out power side-channel attacks on cryptographic implementations. While increasingly-powerful deep learning-based attacks are regularly published, comparatively-little…