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Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence…

Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the…

To protect cryptographic implementations from side-channel vulnerabilities, developers must adopt constant-time programming practices. As these can be error-prone, many side-channel detection tools have been proposed. Despite this, such…

Cache side-channel attacks extract secrets by examining how victim software accesses cache. To date, practical attacks on cryptosystems and media libraries are demonstrated under different scenarios, inferring secret keys and reconstructing…

Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…

Modern processors are highly optimized systems where every single cycle of computation time matters. Many optimizations depend on the data that is being processed. Software-based microarchitectural attacks exploit effects of these…

The complexity of modern processor architectures has given rise to sophisticated interactions among their components. Such interactions may result in potential attack vectors in terms of side channels, possibly available to user-land…

Detection and quantification of information leaks through timing side channels are important to guarantee confidentiality. Although static analysis remains the prevalent approach for detecting timing side channels, it is computationally…

This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…

CPUs provide isolation mechanisms like virtualization and privilege levels to protect software. Yet these focus on architectural isolation while typically overlooking microarchitectural side channels, exemplified by Meltdown and Foreshadow.…

We systematize software side-channel attacks with a focus on vulnerabilities and countermeasures in the cryptographic implementations. Particularly, we survey past research literature to categorize vulnerable implementations, and identify…

Side-channel attacks that leak sensitive information through a computing device's interaction with its physical environment have proven to be a severe threat to devices' security, particularly when adversaries have unfettered physical…

Cache-based side channels enable a dedicated attacker to reveal program secrets by measuring the cache access patterns. Practical attacks have been shown against real-world crypto algorithm implementations such as RSA, AES, and ElGamal. By…

Cybersecurity continues to be a difficult issue for society especially as the number of networked systems grows. Techniques to protect these systems range from rules-based to artificial intelligence-based intrusion detection systems and…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…

We propose a method, based on program analysis and transformation, for eliminating timing side channels in software code that implements security-critical applications. Our method takes as input the original program together with a list of…

Power-based side-channel is a serious security threat to the System on Chip (SoC). The secret information is leaked from the power profile of the system while a cryptographic algorithm is running. The mitigation requires efforts from both…

Cache template attacks demonstrated automated leakage of user input in shared libraries. However, for large binaries, the runtime is prohibitively high. Other automated approaches focused on cryptographic implementations and media software…

Formal verification of cryptographic protocols typically relies on symbolic models that abstract away compiled code and microarchitectural side channels, leaving a gap between verified specifications and deployed executables. We present a…

Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…