Related papers: Mechanism Design with News Utility
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the…
In traditional mechanism design, agents only care about the utility they derive from the outcome of the mechanism. We look at a richer model where agents also assign non-negative dis-utility to the information about their private types…
We study the excludable public project model where the decision is binary (build or not build). In a classic excludable and binary public project model, an agent either consumes the project in its whole or is completely excluded. We study a…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
We develop efficient algorithms to construct utility maximizing mechanisms in the presence of risk averse players (buyers and sellers) in Bayesian settings. We model risk aversion by a concave utility function, and players play…
In a news recommender system, a reader's preferences change over time. Some preferences drift quite abruptly (short-term preferences), while others change over a longer period of time (long-term preferences). Although the existing news…
This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff and a risky action with uncertain payoff, favoring the safe…
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…
Novelty is an important factor of creativity in product design. Acceptance of novelty, however, depends on one's emotions. Yanagisawa, the last author, and his colleagues previously developed a mathematical model of emotional dimensions…
An analyst observes an agent take a sequence of actions. The analyst does not have access to the agent's information and ponders whether the observed actions could be justified through a rational Bayesian model with a known utility…
We study the effect of providing information to agents who queue before a scarce good is distributed at a fixed time. Many information policies reveal "sudden bad news," when agents learn the queue is longer than previously believed. Sudden…
Mechanism design for a social utility being the sum of agents' utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem. There are, however, a number of problems of theoretical and practical interest where a designer may have a different objective than…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
This paper builds a rule for decisionmaking from the physical behavior of single neurons, the well established neural circuitry of mutual inhibition, and the evolutionary principle of natural selection. No axioms are used in the derivation…
Intelligent agents rely on AI/ML functionalities to predict the consequence of possible actions and optimise the policy. However, the effort of the research community in addressing prediction accuracy has been so intense (and successful)…
We consider a ubiquitous scenario in the Internet economy when individual decision-makers (henceforth, agents) both produce and consume information as they make strategic choices in an uncertain environment. This creates a three-way…
We investigate a coordination model for a two-stage collective decision-making problem within the framework of global games. The agents observe noisy signals of a shared random variable, referred to as the fundamental, which determines the…
A Bayesian design is given by maximising an expected utility over a design space. The utility is chosen to represent the aim of the experiment and its expectation is taken with respect to all unknowns: responses, parameters and/or models.…
We analyze the dynamic tradeoff between generating and disclosing evidence. Agents are tempted to delay investing in a new technology in order to learn from information generated by the experiences of others. This informational free-riding…