Related papers: Computing a Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibriu…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
We consider a bilevel continuous knapsack problem where the leader controls the capacity of the knapsack and the follower chooses an optimal packing according to his own profits, which may differ from those of the leader. To this bilevel…
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…
The Nash equilibrium is an important benchmark for behaviour in systems of strategic autonomous agents. Polymatrix games are a succinct and expressive representation of multiplayer games that model pairwise interactions between players. The…
We study the sample complexity of identifying the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in a two-player zero-sum matrix game with noise. Formally, we are given a stochastic model where any learner can sample an entry $(i,j)$ of the input…
Automated hyperparameter search in machine learning, especially for deep learning models, is typically formulated as a bilevel optimization problem, with hyperparameter values determined by the upper level and the model learning achieved by…
We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…
Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (epsilon-Nash equilibria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant. We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It…
This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…
This paper aims to formulate and study the inverse problem of non-cooperative linear quadratic games: Given a profile of control strategies, find cost parameters for which this profile of control strategies is Nash. We formulate the problem…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. We…
This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…