Related papers: The Complexity of Sequential Routing Games
In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…
Given a graph $G$, a set $S$ of vertices in $G$ is a general position set if no triple of vertices from $S$ lie on a common shortest path in $G$. The general position achievement/avoidance game is played on a graph $G$ by players A and B…
Hedge has been proposed as an adaptive scheme, which guides an agent's decision in resource selection and distribution problems that can be modeled as a multi-armed bandit full information game. Such problems are encountered in the areas of…
We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium (SEFCE),…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be…
We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…
In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…
The difference between the speed of the actions of different processes is typically considered as an obstacle that makes the achievement of cooperative goals more difficult. In this work, we aim to highlight potential benefits of such…
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…
We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…
Several mobile agents, modelled as deterministic automata, navigate in an infinite line in synchronous rounds. All agents start in the same round. In each round, an agent can move to one of the two neighboring nodes, or stay idle. Agents…
In this paper, we study the average case complexity of the Unique Games problem. We propose a natural semi-random model, in which a unique game instance is generated in several steps. First an adversary selects a completely satisfiable…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
Consider oriented graph nodes requiring periodic visits by a service agent. The agent moves among the nodes and receives a payoff for each completed service task, depending on the time elapsed since the previous visit to a node. We consider…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
We investigate a two-stage competitive model involving multiple contests. In this model, each contest designer chooses two participants from a pool of candidate contestants and determines the biases. Contestants strategically distribute…
We study the following repeated non-atomic routing game. In every round, nature chooses a state in an i.i.d. manner according to a publicly known distribution, which influences link latency functions. The system planner makes private route…
A directed graph where there is exactly one edge between every pair of vertices is called a {\em tournament}. Finding the "best" set of vertices of a tournament is a well studied problem in social choice theory. A {\em tournament solution}…
We introduce achievement positional games, a convention for positional games which encompasses the Maker-Maker and Maker-Breaker conventions. We consider two hypergraphs, one red and one blue, on the same vertex set. Two players, Left and…
Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents…