Related papers: Strictly strategy-proof auctions
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines, given some choice rule, whether there exists an obviously strategy-proof mechanism for that choice rule.
In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even…
We consider an economic environment with one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ refers to the winning probability of an object, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We consider…
We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…
Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive…
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by…
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…
This paper studies the (group) strategy-proofness aspect of two-sided matching markets under stability. For a one-to-one matching market, we show an equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability. We obtain this…
We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which guarantees that the two sides be treated symmetrically. All…
In a strategy-proof mechanism, the influence of an agent may be measured as the set of outcomes an agent can bring about by varying her (reported) type. More specifically, we refer to an agent's influence on her own relevant outcomes as her…
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in…