Related papers: The Consistency of Arithmetic
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
We offer a mathematical proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic PA formalizable in PA. This result is compatible with Goedel's Second Incompleteness Theorem since our consistency proof does not rely on the representation of consistency as…
We describe a "slow" version of the hierarchy of uniform reflection principles over Peano Arithmetic ($\mathbf{PA}$). These principles are unprovable in Peano Arithmetic (even when extended by usual reflection principles of lower…
The notion of slow provability for Peano Arithmetic ($\mathsf{PA}$) was introduced by S.D. Friedman, M. Rathjen, and A. Weiermann. They studied the slow consistency statement $\mathrm{Con}_{\mathsf{s}}$ that asserts that a contradiction is…
Inconsistency Robustness is performance of information systems with pervasively inconsistent information. Inconsistency Robustness of the community of professional mathematicians is their performance repeatedly repairing contradictions over…
Let $\operatorname{Con}(\mathbf T)\!\restriction\!x$ denote the finite consistency statement "there are no proofs of contradiction in $\mathbf T$ with $\leq x$ symbols". For a large class of natural theories $\mathbf T$, Pudl\'ak has shown…
The aim of this work is to show that contemporary mathematics, including Peano arithmetic, is inconsistent, to construct firm foundations for mathematics, and to begin building on these foundations.
It was shown by Visser that Peano Arithmetic has the property that any two bi-interpretable extensions of it (in the same language) are equivalent. Enayat proposed to refer to this property of a theory as tightness and to carry out a more…
Classical theory proves that every primitive recursive function is strongly representable in PA; that formal Peano Arithmetic, PA, and formal primitive recursive arithmetic, PRA, can both be interpreted in Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, ZF;…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
In this note, we show that, despite the widespread assumption, the consistency formula for Peano Arithmetic PA, Con(PA), "for all x, x is not a code of a derivation of (0=1)," is not equivalent in PA to the consistency of PA. Specifically,…
Gentzen's 1936 proof of the consistency of Peano Arithmetic was a significant result in the foundations of mathematics. We provide here a modified version of the proof, based on G\"{o}del's reformulation, and including additional details…
For Hilbert, the consistency of a formal theory T is an infinite series of statements "D is free of contradictions" for each derivation D and a consistency proof is i) an operation that, given D, yields a proof that D is free of…
In this paper, we argue that formal systems of first order Arithmetic that admit Goedelian undecidable propositions validly are abnormally non-constructive. We argue that, in such systems, the strong representation of primitive recursive…
It is generally accepted that the incompleteness of first-order number theory (PA) is established by an application of Godel's proof. This paper shows that the arithmetization of the syntax of PA implies that the hypothesised class of PA…
In the Handbook of Mathematical Logic, the Paris-Harrington variant of Ramsey's theorem is celebrated as the first result of a long 'search' for a purely mathematical incompleteness result in first-order arithmetic. This paper questions the…
Recently, Artemov [4] offered the notion of constructive consistency for Peano Arithmetic and generalized it to constructive truth and falsity in the spirit of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics and its formalization, the Logic of Proofs.…
Non-compact proofs are a class of reasoning that is used in mathematics but overlooked in the analysis of (un)provability of consistency. We focus on proofs of arithmetical statements (*) "for any natural number n, F(n)." A proof of (*) is…
This paper is about the surprising interaction of a foundational result from model theory, about stability of theories, with algorithmic stability in learning. First, in response to gaps in existing learning models, we introduce a new…
This paper engages the question "Does the consistency of a set of axioms entail the existence of a model in which they are satisfied?" within the frame of the Frege-Hilbert controversy. The question is related historically to the…