Related papers: The Temporary Exchange Problem
We consider a Ramsey model with several households with heterogeneous preferences who are able to borrow capital to each other. Since the capital constraints of one household then depends on the others' capital, one can no longer optimize…
The \textsc{Housing Market} problem is a widely studied resource allocation problem. In this problem, each agent can only receive a single object and has preferences over all objects. Starting from an initial endowment, we want to reach a…
Standard ordinal allocation methods ignore how strongly agents value different improvements, while cardinal methods require additional assumptions that are often considered too demanding. This paper studies assignment problems in the middle…
We explore the core concept in a generalization of the housing market model where agents own fractional endowments while maintaining ordinal preferences. Recognizing that individuals are easier than coalitions to block an allocation, we…
Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work…
We study a multi-objective model on the allocation of reusable resources under model uncertainty. Heterogeneous customers arrive sequentially according to a latent stochastic process, request for certain amounts of resources, and occupy…
House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents.…
We study a problem of optimal allocation in a discrete-time multi-period pure-exchange economy, where agents have preferences over stochastic endowment processes that are represented by strongly time-consistent dynamic risk measures. We…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
Addressing issues of social diversity, we introduce a model of housing transactions between agents who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay. A key assumption is that agents' preferences for a location depend on both an intrinsic…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
This paper exhibits a duality between the theory of Revealed Preference of Afriat and the housing allocation problem of Shapley and Scarf. In particular, it is shown that Afriat's theorem can be interpreted as a second welfare theorem in…
One of the important yet insufficiently studied subjects in fair allocation is the externality effect among agents. For a resource allocation problem, externalities imply that a bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utilities of other…
We study core concepts in the Shapley-Scarf housing market model under unrestricted weak preferences. Among standard concepts, the strong core may be empty while the nonempty weak core may contain Pareto inefficient allocations. We propose…
I develop a revealed preference framework to test whether an aggregate allocation of indivisible objects satisfies Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (PI) without observing individual preferences. Exploiting the type-based…
Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more…
The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange…
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…