Related papers: Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief Utilities
We develop a framework for the analysis of large-scale Ad-auctions where adverts are assigned over a continuum of search types. For this pay-per-click market, we provide an efficient mechanism that maximizes social welfare. In particular,…
We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…
We consider item allocation to individual agents who have additive valuations, in settings in which there are protected groups, and the allocation needs to give each protected group its "fair" share of the total welfare. Informally, within…
We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where…
Recent studies on disparate impact in machine learning applications have sparked a debate around the concept of fairness along with attempts to formalize its different criteria. Many of these approaches focus on reducing prediction errors…
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers purchase bundles to maximize their utility. For this…
We study whether simple algorithmic pricing systems can systematically produce collusive-like prices in multi-firm markets. We consider firms using an explore-then-exploit pipeline: they randomize prices during an initial exploration phase,…
We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among $n$ agents with the objective of maximizing Nash social welfare (NSW). This welfare function is defined as the geometric mean of the agents' valuations and, hence, it strikes a…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger…
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a central fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods, yet its existence is unresolved in general. In the setting with few surplus items, where the number of goods exceeds the number of agents by a…
The maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) -- which maximizes the geometric mean of agents' utilities -- is a fundamental solution concept with remarkable fairness and efficiency guarantees. The computational aspects of NSW have been extensively…
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities when monetary transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known for its remarkable fairness and efficiency properties in the…
In this report we construct two mechanisms that fully implement social welfare maximising allocation in Nash equilibria for the case of a single infinitely divisible good subject to multiple inequality constraints. The first mechanism…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to agents with supermodular utilities to maximize the Nash social welfare. We show that the problem is NP-hard for any approximation factor.
We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive and a payment that will be collected…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…