Related papers: Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief Utilities

We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with possibly different entitlements represented by weights. Previous work has shown that guarantees for additive valuations with existing envy-based notions cannot be…

Several works have recently suggested to model the problem of coordinating the charging needs of a fleet of electric vehicles as a game, and have proposed distributed algorithms to coordinate the vehicles towards a Nash equilibrium of such…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents that have an identical subadditive valuation over the goods. The extent of fairness and efficiency of allocations is measured by the generalized means of the values that the…

In uniform-price markets, suppliers compete to supply a resource to consumers, resulting in a single market price determined by their competition. For sufficient flexibility, producers and consumers prefer to commit to a function as their…

Fair allocation of indivisible goods studies allocating $m$ goods among $n$ agents in a fair manner. While fairness is a fundamental requirement in many real-world applications, it often conflicts with (economic) efficiency. This raises a…

We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of \emph{fair public decision making}, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a…

We consider two models of fair division with indivisible items: one for goods and one for bads. For goods, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (EF1 and EFX for goods) and three common welfare (utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash)…

We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…

We study the question of dividing a collection of indivisible goods amongst a set of agents. The main objective of research in the area is to achieve one of two goals: fairness or efficiency. On the fairness side, envy-freeness is the…

We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even approximately, we propose changing the traditional model.…

We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several…

Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…

Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…

We study the problem of efficiently and fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with identical and additive valuations for the goods. The objective is to maximize the Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the…

This work addresses learning online fair division under uncertainty, where a central planner sequentially allocates items without precise knowledge of agents' values or utilities. Departing from conventional online algorithm, the planner…

We introduce the study of designing allocation mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods in settings with interdependent valuation functions. In our setting, there is a set of goods that needs to be allocated to a set of agents…

We consider the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating a set $\mathcal{G}$ of indivisible goods to a set $\mathcal{N}$ of agents. We study instances, in which all agents have 2-value additive valuations: The value of…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as…

Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…

Reinforcement learning has been shown to be an effective strategy for automatically training policies for challenging control problems. Focusing on non-cooperative multi-agent systems, we propose a novel reinforcement learning framework for…