Related papers: Game-theoretic perspective of Ping-Pong Protocol
This paper studies a two-player game with a quantitative surveillance requirement on an adversarial target moving in a discrete state space and a secondary objective to maximize short-term visibility of the environment. We impose the…
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson and Wilkie showed that side contracting can backfire: even a…
Choosing a hard-to-guess secret is a prerequisite in many security applications. Whether it is a password for user authentication or a secret key for a cryptographic primitive, picking it requires the user to trade-off usability costs with…
We study a patrolling game played on a network $Q$, considered as a metric space. The Attacker chooses a point of $Q$ (not necessarily a node) to attack during a chosen time interval of fixed duration. The Patroller chooses a unit speed…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…
We consider a two-player game in which the first player (the Guesser) tries to guess, edge-by-edge, the path that second player (the Chooser) takes through a directed graph. At each step, the Guesser makes a wager as to the correctness of…
We analyze the two-player game of Knock 'em Down, asymptotically as the number of tokens to be knocked down becomes large. Optimal play requires mixed strategies with deviations of order sqrt(n) from the naive law-of-large numbers…
We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…
Ensuring the security of networked systems is a significant problem, considering the susceptibility of modern infrastructures and technologies to adversarial interference. A central component of this problem is how defensive resources…
We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
We study the computation of Nash equilibria in a two-player normal form game from the perspective of parameterized complexity. Recent results proved hardness for a number of variants, when parameterized by the support size. We complement…
We investigate the problem of equilibrium computation for "large" $n$-player games. Large games have a Lipschitz-type property that no single player's utility is greatly affected by any other individual player's actions. In this paper, we…
We study game-theoretically secure protocols for the classical ordinal assignment problem (aka matching with one-sided preference), in which each player has a total preference order on items. To achieve the fairness notion of equal…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
In the field of international security, understanding the strategic interactions between countries within a networked context is crucial. Our previous research has introduced a ``games-on-signed graphs'' framework~\cite{LiMorse2022} to…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
We address two-player general-sum stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where the leader's policy is optimized considering the best-response follower whose policy is optimal for its reward under the leader. Existing policy gradient and value…
AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay…
How are the advantage relations between a set of agents playing a game organized and how do they reflect the structure of the game? In this paper, we illustrate "Principal Trade-off Analysis" (PTA), a decomposition method that embeds games…