Related papers: Symbolic Verification of Cache Side-channel Freedo…

Side-channel attacks allow an adversary to uncover secret program data by observing the behavior of a program with respect to a resource, such as execution time, consumed memory or response size. Side-channel vulnerabilities are difficult…

Cache timing attack is a type of side channel attack where the leaking timing information due to the cache behaviour of a crypto system is used by an attacker to break the system. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was considered a secure…

Symbolic execution is a software verification technique symbolically running programs and thereby checking for bugs. Ranged symbolic execution performs symbolic execution on program parts, so called path ranges, in parallel. Due to the…

Symbolic Execution is a formal method that can be used to verify the behavior of computer programs and detect software vulnerabilities. Compared to other testing methods such as fuzzing, Symbolic Execution has the advantage of providing…

Implementations of network protocols are often prone to vulnerabilities caused by developers' mistakes when accessing memory regions and dealing with arithmetic operations. Finding practical approaches for checking the security of network…

Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…

The last level cache is vulnerable to timing based side channel attacks because it is shared by the attacker and the victim processes even if they are located on different cores. These timing attacks evict the victim cache lines using small…

The PQDSS standardization process requires cryptographic primitives to be free from vulnerabilities, including timing and cache side-channels. Resistance to timing leakage is therefore an essential property, and achieving this typically…

Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence…

Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…

Modern x86 processors have many prefetch instructions that can be used by programmers to boost performance. However, these instructions may also cause security problems. In particular, we found that on Intel processors, there are two…

The transient execution attack is a type of attack leveraging the vulnerability of modern CPU optimization technologies. New attacks surface rapidly. The side-channel is a key part of transient execution attacks to leak data. In this work,…

Attacks on the microarchitecture of modern processors have become a practical threat to security and privacy in desktop and cloud computing. Recently, cache attacks have successfully been demonstrated on ARM based mobile devices, suggesting…

Modern computer architectures rely on caches to reduce the latency gap between the CPU and main memory. While indispensable for performance, caches pose a serious threat to security because they leak information about memory access patterns…

This paper presents Packet Chasing, an attack on the network that does not require access to the network, and works regardless of the privilege level of the process receiving the packets. A spy process can easily probe and discover the…

WebAssembly (Wasm), as a compact, fast, and isolation-guaranteed binary format, can be compiled from more than 40 high-level programming languages. However, vulnerabilities in Wasm binaries could lead to sensitive data leakage and even…

Covert channels can be utilized to secretly deliver information from high privileged processes to low privileged processes in the context of a high-assurance computing system. In this case study, we investigate the possibility of covert…

Research on cache attacks has shown that CPU caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all cache attacks cause more cache hits and cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance…

Cryptographic research takes software timing side channels seriously. Approaches to mitigate them include constant-time coding and techniques to enforce such practices. However, recent attacks like Meltdown [42], Spectre [37], and…

Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A…