Related papers: Hacking Alice's box in CV-QKD
Quantum cryptographic protocols are typically analysed by assuming that potential opponents can carry out all physical operations, an assumption which grants capabilities far in excess of present technology. Adjusting this assumption to…
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users' devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into…
Quantum cryptography shows that one can guarantee the secrecy of correlation on the sole basis of the laws of physics, that is without limiting the computational power of the eavesdropper. The usual security proofs suppose that the…
In quantum key distribution, one conservatively assumes that the eavesdropper Eve is restricted only by physical laws, whereas the legitimate parties, namely the sender Alice and receiver Bob, are subject to realistic constraints, such as…
Avalanche photodiode based single photon detectors, as crucial and practical components, are widely used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. For effective detection, most of these SPDs are operated in the gated mode, in which the…
We analyze the security of a quantum secure direct communication protocol equipped with authentication. We first propose a specifc attack on the protocol by which, an adversary can break the secret already shared between Alice and Bob, when…
This paper introduces and demonstrates four new statistical attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks utilize compromised random number generators at Alice's/Bob's site(s). The case of…
Several simple yet secure protocols to authenticate the quantum channel of various QKD schemes, by coupling the photon sender's knowledge of a shared secret and the QBER Bob observes, are presented. It is shown that Alice can encrypt…
Recently, a new type of attack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors (SPD) in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, has been proposed. In this paper, we propose another "time-shift" attack that exploits…
This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in…
In this paper we present the quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems. The cornerstone of the attack is that Eve can use unitary (polar) decomposition of her positive-operator valued measure elements, which allows her to…
Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) and its variants can overcome the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD which has been demonstrated in the laboratory and field while their physical implementations with side channels remains to…
We analyze realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) arising from the combination of laser damage attack (LDA) and unambiguous state discrimination (USD). While decoy-state QKD is designed to protect against…
We propose a new adversarial attack on frequency-hopping based wireless communication between two users, namely Alice and Bob. In this attack, the adversary, referred to as Eve, instantaneously modifies the transmitted signal by Alice…
Satellite based quantum key distribution (QKD) aims to establish secure key exchange over long distances despite significant technological challenges. To alleviate some of these challenges, Ghalaii et al. [PRX Quantum 4, 040320 (2023)]…
In a quantum Trojan-horse attack (THA), eavesdroppers learn encoded information by injecting bright light into encoded or decoded devices of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. These attacks severely compromise the security of…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a technologically feasible attack, namely the…
Quantum key distribution protocols based on the quantum eraser phenomenon offer an operational advantage: automatic identification of matching and mismatching encoding choices through interference, eliminating basis reconciliation. However,…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can share an unconditional secure key between two remote parties, but the deviation between theory and practice will break the security of the generated key. In this paper, we evaluate the security of QKD with…
We investigate the possibility of eavesdropping on a quantum key distribution network by local sequential quantum unsharp measurement attacks by the eavesdropper. In particular, we consider a pure two-qubit state shared between two parties…