Related papers: Adversarial Symbolic Execution for Detecting Concu…
Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by…
Contemporary computing employs cache hierarchy to fill the speed gap between processors and main memories. In order to optimise system performance, Last Level Caches(LLC) are shared among all the cores. Cache sharing has made them an…
Side-channel attacks exploit unintended information leakage from system behavior and continue to pose serious privacy risks in modern platforms. Despite extensive prior work, side-channel analysis remains largely manual and fragmented,…
To maximize the information gained from a single execution when verifying a concurrent system, one can derive all concurrency-aware equivalent executions and check them against linear specifications. This paper offers an alternative…
Intruders can infer properties of a system by measuring the time it takes for the system to respond to some request of a given protocol, that is, by exploiting time side channels. These properties may help intruders distinguish whether a…
Global KV-cache sharing is an effective optimization for accelerating large language model (LLM) inference, yet it introduces an API-visible timing side channel that lets adversaries infer sensitive user inputs from shared entries, leading…
Software caches optimize the performance of diverse storage systems, databases and other software systems. Existing works on software caches automatically resort to fully associative cache designs. Our work shows that limited associativity…
When multiple job processes are served by a single scheduler, the queueing delays of one process are often affected by the others, resulting in a timing side channel that leaks the arrival pattern of one process to the others. In this work,…
Symbolic execution is a classic technique for systematic bug finding, which has seen many applications in recent years but remains hard to scale. Recent work introduced ranged symbolic execution to distribute the symbolic execution task…
Timing attacks are considered one of the most damaging side-channel attacks. These attacks exploit timing fluctuations caused by certain operations to disclose confidential information to an attacker. For instance, in asymmetric encryption,…
Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…
Symbolic execution is a powerful verification tool for hardware designs, but suffers from the path explosion problem. We introduce a new approach, piecewise composition, which leverages the modular structure of hardware to transfer the work…
Developers rely on constant-time programming to prevent timing side-channel attacks. But these efforts can be undone by compilers, whose optimizations may silently reintroduce leaks. While recent works have measured the extent of such…
Modern x86 processors support an AVX instruction set to boost performance. However, this extension may cause security issues. We discovered that there are vulnerable properties in implementing masked load/store instructions. Based on this,…
Screaming-channel attacks enable Electromagnetic (EM) Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) at larger distances due to higher EM leakage energies than traditional SCAs, relaxing the requirement of close access to the victim. This attack can be…
Agentic large language model systems increasingly automate tasks by retrieving URLs and calling external tools. We show that this workflow gives rise to implicit prompt injection: adversarial instructions embedded in automatically generated…
In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a…
Timing leaks in timed automata (TA) can occur whenever an attacker is able to deduce a secret by observing some timed behaviour. In execution-time opacity, the attacker aims at deducing whether a private location was visited, by observing…
With increasingly sophisticated cyber-adversaries able to access a wider repertoire of mechanisms to implant malware such as ransomware, CPU/GPU keyloggers, and stealthy kernel rootkits, there is an urgent need for techniques to detect and…
Information flow security ensures that the secret data manipulated by a program does not influence its observable output. Proving information flow security is especially challenging for concurrent programs, where operations on secret data…