Related papers: Adversarial Symbolic Execution for Detecting Concu…

Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. Yet, they leave side-channel leakage outside their threat model, shifting the responsibility of mitigating such…

Research on cache attacks has shown that CPU caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all cache attacks cause more cache hits and cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance…

With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities…

Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…

Many security and software testing applications require checking whether certain properties of a program hold for any possible usage scenario. For instance, a tool for identifying software vulnerabilities may need to rule out the existence…

In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart from direct and indirect flows a secret information can be leaked through covert timing channels. That is, no two computations of a program…

Timing channels are information flows, encoded in the relative timing of events, that bypass the system's protection mechanisms. Any microarchitectural state that depends on execution history and affects the rate of progress of later…

Cache timing attacks use shared caches in multi-core processors as side channels to extract information from victim processes. These attacks are particularly dangerous in cloud infrastructures, in which the deployed countermeasures cause…

Micro-architectural attacks use information leaked through shared resources to break hardware-enforced isolation. These attacks have been used to steal private information ranging from cryptographic keys to privileged Operating System (OS)…

In cache-based side channel attacks, an attacker infers information about the victim based on the presence, or lack thereof, of one or more cachelines. Determining a cacheline's presence, which we refer to as "reading the signal", typically…

Cache-timing attacks exploit microarchitectural characteristics to leak sensitive data, posing a severe threat to modern systems. Despite its severity, analyzing the vulnerability of a given cache structure against cache-timing attacks is…

The last level cache is vulnerable to timing based side channel attacks because it is shared by the attacker and the victim processes even if they are located on different cores. These timing attacks evict the victim cache lines using small…

Over the past decade, side-channels have proven to be significant and practical threats to modern computing systems. Recent attacks have all exploited the underlying shared hardware. While practical, mounting such a complicated attack is…

Large Language Models (LLMs) that can be deployed locally have recently gained popularity for privacy-sensitive tasks, with companies such as Meta, Google, and Intel playing significant roles in their development. However, the security of…

Cache-based side channels enable a dedicated attacker to reveal program secrets by measuring the cache access patterns. Practical attacks have been shown against real-world crypto algorithm implementations such as RSA, AES, and ElGamal. By…

The implementations of most hardened cryptographic libraries use defensive programming techniques for side-channel resistance. These techniques are usually specified as guidelines to developers on specific code patterns to use or avoid.…

Timing side-channels are an important threat to cryptography that still needs to be addressed in implementations, and the advent of post-quantum cryptography raises this issue because the lattice-based schemes may produce secret-dependent…

Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) Codes detect adversarial noise that is added to a coded message and stored in a storage that is opaque to the adversary. We study AMD codes when the storage can leak up to \rho\log|G| bits of…

Information leakage to a guessing adversary in index coding is studied, where some messages in the system are sensitive and others are not. The non-sensitive messages can be used by the server like secret keys to mitigate leakage of the…

While cryptographic algorithms such as the ubiquitous Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are secure, *physical implementations* of these algorithms in hardware inevitably 'leak' sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. A particularly…