Related papers: FocusST Solution for Analysis of Cryptographic Pro…
This paper presents an Isabelle/HOL+Isar set of theories which allows to specify crypto-based components and to verify their composition properties wrt. cryptographic aspects. We introduce a formalisation of the security property of data…
This set of theories presents a formalisation in Isabelle/HOL+Isar of data dependencies between components. The approach allows to analyse system structure oriented towards efficient checking of system: it aims at elaborating for a concrete…
Testing of network services represents one of the biggest challenges in cyber security. Because new vulnerabilities are detected on a regular basis, more research is needed. These faults have their roots in the software development cycle or…
Privacy analysis is critical but also a time-consuming and tedious task. We present a formalization which eases designing and auditing high-level privacy properties of software architectures. It is incorporated into a larger policy analysis…
For the formal verification of a network security policy, it is crucial to express the verification goals. These formal goals, called security invariants, should be easy to express for the end user. Focusing on access control and…
We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…
In this report, we aim at establishing proper ways for model checking the global security of distributed systems, which are designed consisting of set of localised security policies that enforce specific issues about the security expected.…
This paper presents a formal specification of the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol using FocusST framework. We formally describe core components of the protocol, which provides a basis for further formal analysis using the…
This article provides formal definitions characterizing well-formed composition of components in order to guarantee their safe deployment and execution. Our work focuses on the structural aspects of component composition; it puts together…
Controller synthesis for hybrid systems that satisfy temporal specifications expressing various system properties is a challenging problem that has drawn the attention of many researchers. However, making the assumption that such temporal…
In this work we present and formally analyze CHAT-SRP (CHAos based Tickets-Secure Registration Protocol), a protocol to provide interactive and collaborative platforms with a cryptographically robust solution to classical security issues.…
The statistical distribution, when determined from an incomplete set of constraints, is shown to be suitable as host for encrypted information. We design an encoding/decoding scheme to embed such a distribution with hidden information. The…
The relation between Ising spin systems and public-key cryptography is investigated using methods of statistical physics. The insight gained from the analysis is used for devising a matrix-based cryptosystem whereby the ciphertext comprises…
Cryptographic Protocols (CP) are distributed algorithms intended for secure communication in an insecure environment. They are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, systems of confidential data processing,…
In this paper, we investigate the probabilistic formal verification of stochastic dynamical systems over continuous state spaces. Motivated by problems in state estimation and information-flow security, we introduce the notion of…
To analyse and verify the safety and security properties of interactive systems, a formal specification might be necessary. There are many types of formal languages and frameworks. The decision regarding what type of formal specification…
Cryptographic protocols play a fundamental role in securing modern digital infrastructure, but they are often deployed without prior formal verification. This could lead to the adoption of distributed systems vulnerable to attack vectors.…
Security of cryptographic protocols can be analysed by creating a model in a formal language and verifying the model in a tool. All such tools focus on the last part of the analysis, verification, and the interpretation of the specification…
We introduce Cryptis, an extension of the Iris separation logic that can be used to verify cryptographic components using the symbolic model of cryptography. The combination of separation logic and cryptographic reasoning allows us to prove…
Internet browsers use security protocols to protect sensitive messages. An inductive analysis of TLS (a descendant of SSL 3.0) has been performed using the theorem prover Isabelle. Proofs are based on higher-order logic and make no…