Related papers: Facing Multiple Attacks in Adversarial Patrolling …

We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…

Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions.…

We extend the adversarial/non-stochastic multi-play multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) to the case where the number of arms to play is variable. The work is motivated by the fact that the resources allocated to scan different critical locations in…

There has been significant interest in studying security games for modeling the interplay of attacks and defenses on various systems involving critical infrastructure, financial system security, political campaigns, and civil safeguarding.…

Adversarial Patrolling games form a subclass of Security games where a Defender moves between locations, guarding vulnerable targets. The main algorithmic problem is constructing a strategy for the Defender that minimizes the worst damage…

We present solutions to a continuous patrolling game played on network. In this zero-sum game, an Attacker chooses a time and place to attack a network for a fixed amount of time. A Patroller patrols the network with the aim of intercepting…

The recent advancement in real-world critical infrastructure networks has led to an exponential growth in the use of automated devices which in turn has created new security challenges. In this paper, we study the robust and adaptive…

Data injection attacks have recently emerged as a significant threat on the smart power grid. By launching data injection attacks, an adversary can manipulate the real-time locational marginal prices to obtain economic benefits. Despite the…

Attack detection is usually approached as a classification problem. However, standard classification tools often perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent…

Resource allocation is the process of optimizing the rare resources. In the area of security, how to allocate limited resources to protect a massive number of targets is especially challenging. This paper addresses this resource allocation…

Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems…

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or resources through a sequence of stealthy attacks consisting of multiple stages. Dynamic information flow tracking has been proposed…

We develop an analytical Stackelberg game framework for optimal resource allocation in a sequential attacker--defender setting with a finite set of assets and probabilistic attacks. The defender commits to a mixed protection strategy, after…

Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…

Anomaly detection is a method for discovering unusual and suspicious behavior. In many real-world scenarios, the examined events can be directly linked to the actions of an adversary, such as attacks on computer networks or frauds in…

In cybersecurity, attackers range from brash, unsophisticated script kiddies and cybercriminals to stealthy, patient advanced persistent threats. When modeling these attackers, we can observe that they demonstrate different risk-seeking and…

Parallel server systems in transportation, manufacturing, and computing heavily rely on dynamic routing using connected cyber components for computation and communication. Yet, these components remain vulnerable to random malfunctions and…

We address the problem of allocating limited resources in a network under persistent yet statistically unknown adversarial attacks. Each node in the network may be degraded, but not fully disabled, depending on its available defensive…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…