Related papers: Limited Information Strategies and Discrete Select…

In this article we analyze a partial-information Nash Q-learning algorithm for a general 2-player stochastic game. Partial information refers to the setting where a player does not know the strategy or the actions taken by the opposing…

We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…

An unknown positive number of items arrive at independent uniformly distributed times in the interval [0,1] to a selector, whose task is to pick online the last one. We show that under the assumption of an adversary determining the number…

Minority game is a model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. In this game, each player chooses one out of two alternatives every turn and those who end up in the minority side wins. It is instructive to extend the minority game…

In this article, we introduce certain kinds of computable reduction games with imperfect information. One can view such a game as an extension of the notion of Turing reduction, and generalized Weihrauch reduction as well. Based on the work…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

We give an algorithm for solving stochastic parity games with almost-sure winning conditions on lossy channel systems, for the case where the players are restricted to finite-memory strategies. First, we describe a general framework, where…

We study the problem of deciding the winner of reachability switching games for zero-, one-, and two-player variants. Switching games provide a deterministic analogue of stochastic games. We show that the zero-player case is NL-hard, the…

We study two-player multi-weighted reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where an agent, called P1, has several quantitative reachability objectives that he wants to optimize against an antagonistic environment, called P2.…

This paper considers a formulation of a differential game with constrained dynamics, where one player selects the dynamics and the other selects the applicable cost. When the game is considered on a finite time horizon, its value satisfies…

We study self-triggered two-player stochastic games on Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMPs) where each agent decides when to observe and which open-loop action to hold. Augmenting the state with clocks and committed controls…

This paper presents a potential game approach for distributed cooperative selection of informative sensors, when the goal is to maximize the mutual information between the measurement variables and the quantities of interest. It is proved…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

We introduce the "relative diffuseness" assumption to characterize the differences between payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant diffuseness of information. Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with…

We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…

We consider {\em bidding games}, a class of two-player zero-sum {\em graph games}. The game proceeds as follows. Both players have bounded budgets. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, in each turn the players simultaneously submit…

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a convex set is approachable in a game with partial monitoring, i.e.\ where players do not observe their opponents' moves but receive random signals. This condition is an extension…

We demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. We distinguish two formal notions of bilateral strategic…

We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions…