Related papers: On Critical Threshold Value for Simple Games
We describe a robust methodology, based on the martingale argument of Nachmias and Peres and random walk estimates, to obtain simple upper and lower bounds on the size of a maximal component in several random graphs \textit{at criticality}.…
The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may…
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a convex set is approachable in a game with partial monitoring, i.e.\ where players do not observe their opponents' moves but receive random signals. This condition is an extension…
Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., "yes" and "no", every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
A qualitative account is given of a differential pursuit/evasion game. A criterion for the existence of an intercept solution is obtained using future cones that contain all attainable trajectories of target or interceptor originating from…
We prove an $N^{2-o(1)}$ lower bound on the randomized communication complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium (for constant $\epsilon>0$) in a two-player $N\times N$ game.
The minority game is a simple congestion game in which the players' main goal is to choose among two options the one that is adopted by the smallest number of players. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria and the limiting behavior of…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…
We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and…
In the context of multiplayer games, the parallel repetition problem can be phrased as follows: given a game $G$ with optimal winning probability $1-\alpha$ and its repeated version $G^n$ (in which $n$ games are played together, in…
Cybersecurity games are an attractive and popular method of active learning. However, the majority of current games are created for advanced players, which often leads to frustration in less experienced learners. Therefore, we decided to…
Mean-payoff games on timed automata are played on the infinite weighted graph of configurations of priced timed automata between two players, Player Min and Player Max, by moving a token along the states of the graph to form an infinite…
In an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon in expectation by unilateral deviation. An epsilon well-supported approximate Nash equilibrium has the stronger requirement that every pure strategy used with…
With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…
We study two-player zero-sum recursive games with a countable state space and finite action spaces at each state. When the family of $n$-stage values $\{v_n,n\geq 1\}$ is totally bounded for the uniform norm, we prove the existence of the…
In a recent paper, Junge and Palazuelos presented two two-player games exhibiting interesting properties. In their first game, entangled players can perform notably better than classical players. The quantitative gap between the two cases…
A recent paper by Bhatia, Chin, Mani, and Mossel (2026) defined stochastic processes aimed at modeling the game of War for {\em two players} with $n$ cards. That paper showed that these models, assuming uniform random decks, are equivalent…
In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…
The convexification numerical method with the rigorously established global convergence property is constructed for a problem for the Mean Field Games System of the second order. This is the problem of the retrospective analysis of a game…