Related papers: On Critical Threshold Value for Simple Games
A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…
Simple stochastic games can be solved by value iteration (VI), which yields a sequence of under-approximations of the value of the game. This sequence is guaranteed to converge to the value only in the limit. Since no stopping criterion is…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
We study the performance of Fictitious Play, when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game. We exhibit a class of 2-player games having payoffs in the range [0,1] that show that Fictitious Play…
We study the evolution of cooperation under the assumption that the collective benefits of group membership can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within the group, i.e. their critical mass, exceeds a threshold value.…
Taking the absolute value of consecutive differences of a cyclicly ordered list of integers constitutes a simple dynamical system. For lists of lenght a power of two the process will terminate in all zeros, but examples with arbitarily long…
In a $(1:b)$ Maker-Breaker game, a primary question is to find the maximal value of $b$ that allows Maker to win the game (that is, the critical bias $b^*$). Erd\H{o}s conjectured that the critical bias for many Maker-Breaker games played…
In Zeng et al. [Fluct. Noise Lett. 7 (2007) L439--L447] the analysis of the lowest unique positive integer game is simplified by some reasonable assumptions that make the problem tractable for arbitrary numbers of players. However, here we…
Bertrand et al. [1] (LMCS 2019) describe two-player zero-sum games in which one player tries to achieve a reachability objective in $n$ games (on the same finite arena) simultaneously by broadcasting actions, and where the opponent has full…
An average-time game is played on the infinite graph of configurations of a finite timed automaton. The two players, Min and Max, construct an infinite run of the automaton by taking turns to perform a timed transition. Player Min wants to…
The codegree threshold $\mathrm{ex}_2(n, F)$ of a $3$-graph $F$ is the minimum $d=d(n)$ such that every $3$-graph on $n$ vertices in which every pair of vertices is contained in at least $d+1$ edges contains a copy of $F$ as a subgraph. We…
We establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) threshold problem for mean-payoff games is NP-complete. While the SPE threshold problem was recently shown to be decidable (in doubly exponential time) and NP-hard, its exact worst…
We consider the task of computing an approximation of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium for an n-player game in strategic form, n >= 3. We show that this task is complete for the complexity class FIXP_a. In particular, the task is…
One of the major outstanding foundational problems about boolean functions is the sensitivity conjecture, which (in one of its many forms) asserts that the degree of a boolean function (i.e. the minimum degree of a real polynomial that…
We consider multiplayer stochastic games in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of Martin (1998) and Maitra and Sudderth (1998), we show…
XOR games are the simplest model in which the nonlocal properties of entanglement manifest themselves. When there are two players, it is well known that the bias --- the maximum advantage over random play --- of entangled players can be at…
We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…
The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal-form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small Lipschitz constant admit pure {\epsilon}-equilibria, and pinpoint…
In this paper, some new criteria for detecting whether a finite game is potential are proposed by solving potential equations. The verification equations with the minimal number for checking a potential game are obtained for the first time.…
A conjecture of Richter and Salazar about graphs that are critical for a fixed crossing number $k$ is that they have bounded bandwidth. A weaker well-known conjecture of Richter is that their maximum degree is bounded in terms of $k$. In…