Related papers: Eliminating Timing Side-Channel Leaks using Progra…

In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart from direct and indirect flows a secret information can be leaked through covert timing channels. That is, no two computations of a program…

To protect cryptographic implementations from side-channel vulnerabilities, developers must adopt constant-time programming practices. As these can be error-prone, many side-channel detection tools have been proposed. Despite this, such…

Formal verification of power side-channel leakage and its countermeasures in cryptographic algorithms is challenging, as SAT-based methods fail to scale on XOR-heavy, time-unrolled cryptographic circuits with realistic leakage models. We…

Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…

Constant-time code has become the de-facto standard for secure cryptographic implementations. However, some memory-based leakage classes such as ciphertext side-channels and silent stores remain unaddressed. Prior work proposed three…

Embedded neural-network inference can leak information through timing side channels, including leakage caused by the evaluation of activation functions. This work proposes a constant-time implementation methodology for activation functions…

Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and subsequently infer typed words and sentences.…

Timing side-channels are an important threat to cryptography that still needs to be addressed in implementations, and the advent of post-quantum cryptography raises this issue because the lattice-based schemes may produce secret-dependent…

Side-channel attacks allow extracting secret information from the execution of cryptographic primitives by correlating the partially known computed data and the measured side-channel signal. However, to set up a successful side-channel…

Mathematically-secure cryptographic algorithms leak significant side channel information through their power supplies when implemented on a physical platform. These side channel leakages can be exploited by an attacker to extract the secret…

Modern computer processors use microarchitectural optimization mechanisms to improve performance. As a downside, such optimizations are prone to introducing side-channel vulnerabilities. Speculative loading of memory, called prefetching, is…

Side-channel attacks are a security exploit that take advantage of information leakage. They use measurement and analysis of physical parameters to reverse engineer and extract secrets from a system. Power analysis attacks in particular,…

Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…

Leakage contracts have recently been proposed as a new security abstraction at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level. Such contracts aim to faithfully capture the information processors may leak through side effects of their…

In cache-based side channel attacks, an attacker infers information about the victim based on the presence, or lack thereof, of one or more cachelines. Determining a cacheline's presence, which we refer to as "reading the signal", typically…

The complexity of modern processor architectures has given rise to sophisticated interactions among their components. Such interactions may result in potential attack vectors in terms of side channels, possibly available to user-land…

Timing side channels pose a significant threat to the security and privacy of software applications. We propose an approach for mitigating this problem by decreasing the strength of the side channels as measured by entropy-based objectives,…

Cache-based side channels enable a dedicated attacker to reveal program secrets by measuring the cache access patterns. Practical attacks have been shown against real-world crypto algorithm implementations such as RSA, AES, and ElGamal. By…

Most current approaches for protecting privacy in machine learning (ML) assume that models exist in a vacuum. Yet, in reality, these models are part of larger systems that include components for training data filtering, output monitoring,…

This paper presents an approach for side channel cryptanalysis with iterative approximate Bayesian inference, based on sequential decoding methods. Reliability information about subkey hypotheses is generated in the form of likelihoods, and…