Related papers: Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertain…
We investigate an optimal reinsurance problem for an insurance company facing a constant fixed cost when the reinsurance contract is signed. The insurer needs to optimally choose both the starting time of the reinsurance contract and the…
I analyze long-term contracting in insurance markets with asymmetric information. The buyer privately observes her risk type, which evolves stochastically over time. A long-term contract specifies a menu of insurance policies, contingent on…
We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems in presence of adverse selection. The particular features…
This paper characterises optimal incentive schemes for ESG disclosure in a continuous-time principal-agent setting. We model a risk-averse principal (e.g., a platform or standard-setter) contracting with a team of heterogeneous agents whose…
The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and…
In this article we consider a special case of an optimal consumption/optimal portfolio problem first studied by Constantinides and Magill and by Davis and Norman, in which an agent with constant relative risk aversion seeks to maximise…
We initiate the study of online contracts, which integrate the game-theoretic considerations of economic contract theory, with the algorithmic and informational challenges of online algorithm design. Our starting point is the classic online…
This paper studies a dynamic screening model in which a principal hires an agent with limited liability. The agent's private cost of working is an i.i.d. draw from a continuous distribution. His working status is publicly observable. The…
We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are $N$ projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent…
This paper studies social optimal control of mean field LQG (linear-quadratic-Gaussian) models with uncertainty. Specially, the uncertainty is represented by a uncertain drift which is common for all agents. A robust optimization approach…
We study the problem of maximising terminal utility for an agent facing model uncertainty, in a frictionless discrete-time market with one safe asset and finitely many risky assets. We show that an optimal investment strategy exists if the…
We study a repeated Principal Agent problem between a long lived Principal and Agent pair in a prior free setting. In our setting, the sequence of realized states of nature may be adversarially chosen, the Agent is non-myopic, and the…
We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings. An informed principal observes an external parameter of the world and advises an uninformed agent about actions to take over time. The agent takes…
Models of economic decision makers often include idealized assumptions, such as rationality, perfect foresight, and access to all relevant pieces of information. These assumptions often assure the models' internal validity, but, at the same…
In this paper, we study the finite-horizon problem of an economic agent's optimal consumption, investment, and job-switching decisions. The key new feature of our model is that the job-switching cost is time-varying. This extension leads to…
In this work, we study sequential contracts under matroid constraints. In the sequential setting, an agent can take actions one by one. After each action, the agent observes the stochastic value of the action and then decides which action…
We study a model of moral hazard with heterogeneous beliefs where each of agent's actions gives rise to a pair of probability distributions over output levels, one representing the beliefs of the agent and the other those of the principal.…
This paper provides a complete review of the continuous-time optimal contracting problem introduced by Sannikov, in the extended context allowing for possibly different discount rates for both parties. The agent's problem is to seek for…
We investigate the existence of an optimal policy to monitor a mean field systems of agents managing a risky project under moral hazard with accidents modeled by L\'evy processes magnified by the law of the project. We provide a general…
With the recent growing number of cyberattacks and the constant lack of effective defense methods, cyber risks become ubiquitous in enterprise networks, manufacturing plants, and government computer systems. Cyber-insurance provides a…