Related papers: Automated Verification of Accountability in Securi…
Accountability is an often called for property of technical systems. It is a requirement for algorithmic decision systems, autonomous cyber-physical systems, and for software systems in general. As a concept, accountability goes back to the…
Little can be achieved in the design of security protocols without trusting at least some participants. This trust should be justified or, at the very least, subject to examination. One way to strengthen trustworthiness is to hold parties…
Accountability is the property of a system that enables the uncovering of causes for events and helps understand who or what is responsible for these events. Definitions and interpretations of accountability differ; however, they are…
Accountability aims to provide explanations for why unwanted situations occurred, thus providing means to assign responsibility and liability. As such, accountability has slightly different meanings across the sciences. In computer science,…
Accountability, the ability to provably identify protocol violators, gained prominence as the main economic argument for the security of proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols. Rollups, the most popular scaling solution for blockchains, typically…
While the exact definition and implementation of accountability depend on the specific context, at its core accountability describes a mechanism that will make decisions transparent and often provides means to sanction "bad" decisions. As…
Protocols for tasks such as authentication, electronic voting, and secure multiparty computation ensure desirable security properties if agents follow their prescribed programs. However, if some agents deviate from their prescribed programs…
We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…
Security verification of communication protocols in industrial and safety-critical systems is challenging because implementations are often proprietary, accessible only as black boxes, and too complex for manual modeling. As a result,…
Accountability is widely understood as a goal for well governed computer systems, and is a sought-after value in many governance contexts. But how can it be achieved? Recent work on standards for governable artificial intelligence systems…
Network protocols are programs with inputs and outputs that follow predefined communication patterns to synchronize and exchange information. There are many protocols and each serves a different purpose, e.g., routing, transport, secure…
In the paper we introduce a process model of security protocols, where processes are graphs with edges labelled by actions, and present a new method of specification and verification of security protocols based on this model.
A long-standing research problem in security protocol design is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states. In this paper, we address this problem by first proposing a protocol specification framework,…
A cryptographic protocol (CP) is a distributed algorithm designed to provide a secure communication in an insecure environment. CPs are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, database access systems, etc.…
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysis is an attractive, but non-trivial approach. We have…
Trust is an absolute necessity for digital communications; but is often viewed as an implicit singular entity. The use of the internet as the primary vehicle for information exchange has made accountability and verifiability of system code…
Monitorability delineates what properties can be verified at runtime. Although many monitorability definitions exist, few are defined explicitly in terms of the guarantees provided by monitors, i.e., the computational entities carrying out…
Current formal approaches have been successfully used to find design flaws in many security protocols. However, it is still challenging to automatically analyze protocols due to their large or infinite state spaces. In this paper, we…
Given a behavior of interest in the program, statically determining the corresponding responsible entity is a task of critical importance, especially in program security. Classical static analysis techniques (e.g. dependency analysis, taint…
Determining if two protocols can be securely composed requires analyzing not only their additive properties but also their destructive properties. In this paper we propose a new composition method for constructing protocols based on…