Related papers: Time pressure and honesty in a deception game
Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix…
Individual differences in personality determine our preferences, traits and values, which should similarly hold for the way we express ourselves. With current advancements and transformations of technology and society, text-based…
Building reliable deception detectors for AI systems -- methods that could predict when an AI system is being strategically deceptive without necessarily requiring behavioural evidence -- would be valuable in mitigating risks from advanced…
We study a disclosure game with a large evidence space. There is an unknown binary state. A sender observes a sequence of binary signals about the state and discloses a left truncation of the sequence to a receiver in order to convince him…
The basic problem in the cooperation theory is to justify the cooperation. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also on the co-player's…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
Agents' judgment depends on perception and previous knowledge. Assuming that previous knowledge depends on perception, we can say that judgment depends on perception. So, if judgment depends on perception, can agents judge that they have…
So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…
An individual can only experience regret if she learns about an unchosen alternative. In many situations, learning about an unchosen alternative is possible only if someone else chose it. We develop a model where the ex-post information…
In order to build reliable and trustworthy NLP applications, models need to be both fair across different demographics and explainable. Usually these two objectives, fairness and explainability, are optimized and/or examined independently…
Predicting the outcomes of cyber-physical systems with multiple human interactions is a challenging problem. This article reviews a game theoretical approach to address this issue, where reinforcement learning is employed to predict the…
We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which…
Understanding how people behave in strategic settings--where they make decisions based on their expectations about the behavior of others--is a long-standing problem in the behavioral sciences. We conduct the largest study to date of…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
The evaluation and post-training of large language models (LLMs) rely on supervision, but strong supervision for difficult tasks is often unavailable, especially when evaluating frontier models. In such cases, models are demonstrated to…
Chess engines passed human strength years ago, but they still don't play like humans. A grandmaster under clock pressure blunders in ways a club player on a hot streak never would. Conventional engines capture none of this. This paper…
Patterns of wins and losses in pairwise contests, such as occur in sports and games, consumer research and paired comparison studies, and human and animal social hierarchies, are commonly analyzed using probabilistic models that allow one…
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…
This paper investigates how natural language communication with an AI agent affects human cooperative behaviour in indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games. We conduct a laboratory experiment (n = 126) with two between-subjects…
People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and…