Related papers: Faster Rates for Convex-Concave Games
Learning in games refers to scenarios where multiple players interact in a shared environment, each aiming to minimize their regret. An equilibrium can be computed at a fast rate of $O(1/T)$ when all players follow the optimistic…
In this paper, we establish efficient and uncoupled learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in multiplayer perfect-recall imperfect-information extensive-form games, the trigger regret of each player grows as $O(\log T)$…
We consider the problem of minimizing different notions of swap regret in online optimization. These forms of regret are tightly connected to correlated equilibrium concepts in games, and have been more recently shown to guarantee…
Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games, such as poker. Yet, surprisingly little is known so far in…
We propose efficient no-regret learning dynamics and ellipsoid-based methods for computing linear correlated equilibria$\unicode{x2014}$a relaxation of correlated equilibria and a strengthening of coarse correlated…
In this work, we explore online convex optimization (OCO) and introduce a new condition and analysis that provides fast rates by exploiting the curvature of feasible sets. In online linear optimization, it is known that if the average…
In this paper, the online variants of the classical Frank-Wolfe algorithm are considered. We consider minimizing the regret with a stochastic cost. The online algorithms only require simple iterative updates and a non-adaptive step size…
In this paper, we investigate the power of {\it regularization}, a common technique in reinforcement learning and optimization, in solving extensive-form games (EFGs). We propose a series of new algorithms based on regularizing the payoff…
We give a simple proof that the Frank-Wolfe algorithm obtains a stationary point at a rate of $O(1/\sqrt{t})$ on non-convex objectives with a Lipschitz continuous gradient. Our analysis is affine invariant and is the first, to the best of…
This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of…
In this paper, we investigate the online non-convex optimization problem which generalizes the classic {online convex optimization problem by relaxing the convexity assumption on the cost function. For this type of problem, the classic…
We consider online no-regret learning in unknown games with bandit feedback, where each player can only observe its reward at each time -- determined by all players' current joint action -- rather than its gradient. We focus on the class of…
In this paper, we introduce a new projection-free algorithm for Online Convex Optimization (OCO) with a state-of-the-art regret guarantee among separation-based algorithms. Existing projection-free methods based on the classical Frank-Wolfe…
We investigate constrained online convex optimization, in which decisions must belong to a fixed and typically complicated domain, and are required to approximately satisfy additional time-varying constraints over the long term. In this…
To deal with non-stationary online problems with complex constraints, we investigate the dynamic regret of online Frank-Wolfe (OFW), which is an efficient projection-free algorithm for online convex optimization. It is well-known that in…
We present new efficient \textit{projection-free} algorithms for online convex optimization (OCO), where by projection-free we refer to algorithms that avoid computing orthogonal projections onto the feasible set, and instead relay on…
Constructing effective algorithms to converge to Nash Equilibrium (NE) is an important problem in algorithmic game theory. Prior research generally posits that the upper bound on the convergence rate for games is $O\left(T^{-1/2}\right)$.…
This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in Cournot games with continuous actions. Cournot games are the essential model for many socio-economic systems, where players compete by strategically setting their output quantity.…
Non-ergodic convergence of learning dynamics in games is widely studied recently because of its importance in both theory and practice. Recent work (Cai et al., 2024) showed that a broad class of learning dynamics, including Optimistic…
We show that, for any sufficiently small fixed $\epsilon > 0$, when both players in a general-sum two-player (bimatrix) game employ optimistic mirror descent (OMD) with smooth regularization, learning rate $\eta = O(\epsilon^2)$ and $T =…