Related papers: A note on non-coercive first order Mean Field Game…

In this paper we consider a mean field approach to modeling the agents flow over a transportation network. In particular, beside a standard framework of mean field games, with controlled dynamics by the agents and costs mass-distribution…

In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each…

In this paper we study a mean field model for discrete time, finite number of states, dynamic games. These models arise in situations that involve a very large number of agents moving from state to state according to certain optimality…

This paper studies the connections between mean-field games and the social welfare optimization problems. We consider a mean field game in functional spaces with a large population of agents, each of which seeks to minimize an individual…

We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting through an evolutionary game driven by a replicator dynamics. Strategies evolve by a replicator dynamics influenced by the position and the…

In a mean field game of controls, players seek to minimize a cost that depends on the joint distribution of players' states and controls. We consider an ergodic problem for second-order mean field games of controls with state constraints,…

In this paper, we consider a first-order mean field game model motivated by crowd motion in which agents evolve in a (not necessarily compact) metric space and wish to reach a given target set. Each agent aims to minimize the sum of their…

In this paper, we consider a first-order deterministic mean field game model inspired by crowd motion in which agents moving in a given domain aim to reach a given target set in minimal time. To model interaction between agents, we assume…

In this paper we study a two dimensional crowd model where pedestrian velocity consists of two elements: a non--local interaction term, modeling the effect of other walkers on each individual, and a control term. This latter term can be…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…

We prove well-posedness of a class of kinetic-type Mean Field Games, which typically arise when agents control their acceleration. Such systems include independent variables representing the spatial position as well as velocity. We consider…

This paper presents recent results from Mean Field Game theory underlying the introduction of common noise that imposes to incorporate the distribution of the agents as a state variable. Starting from the usual mean field games equations…

In an extended mean field game the vector field governing the flow of the population can be different from that of the individual player at some mean field equilibrium. This new class strictly includes the standard mean field games. It is…

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

The primary objective of this paper is to understand first-order, time-dependent mean-field games with Neumann boundary conditions, a question that remains under-explored in the literature. This matter is particularly relevant given the…

We consider a model of cultural evolution for a strategy selection in a population of individuals who interact in a game theoretic framework. The evolution combines individual learning of the environment (population strategy profile),…

This work is mainly concerned with the so-called limit theory for mean-field games. Adopting the weak formulation paradigm put forward by Carmona and Lacker, we consider a fully non-Markovian setting allowing for drift control and…

We consider the problem of representing collective behavior of large populations and predicting the evolution of a population distribution over a discrete state space. A discrete time mean field game (MFG) is motivated as an interpretable…