Related papers: Bribery Games on Interdependent Complex Networks

Global cooperation often falters despite shared objectives, as misaligned interests and unequal incentives undermine collective efforts, such as those in international climate change collaborations. To tackle this issue, this paper…

We investigate cascades in networks consisting of strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the strategic agents have choices between i) investing in protecting themselves, ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some)…

Trust and reciprocation of it form the foundation of economic, social and other interactions. While the Trust Game is widely used to study these concepts for interactions between two players, often alternating different roles (i.e.,…

The dynamics of herd immunity depend crucially on the interaction between collective social behavior and disease transmission, but the role of heterogeneity in this context frequently remains unclear. Here, we dissect this co-evolutionary…

We investigate a game-theoretic model of a social system where both the rules of the game and the interaction structure are shaped by the behavior of the agents. We call this type of model, with several types of feedback couplings from the…

Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been…

When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…

From social contracts to climate agreements, individuals engage in groups that must collectively reach decisions with varying levels of equality and fairness. These dilemmas also pervade Distributed Artificial Intelligence, in domains such…

Complex networks serve as abstract models for understanding real-world complex systems and provide frameworks for studying structured dynamical systems. This article addresses limitations in current studies on the exploration of individual…

A model of Boolean agents competing in a market is presented where each agent bases his action on information obtained from a small group of other agents. The agents play a competitive game that rewards those in the minority. After a long…

Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…

Most previous works study the evolution of cooperation in a structured population by commonly employing an isolated single network. However, realistic systems are composed of many interdependent networks coupled with each other, rather than…

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…

We consider a social learning problem, where a network of agents is interested in selecting one among a finite number of hypotheses. We focus on weakly-connected graphs where the network is partitioned into a sending part and a receiving…

In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…

Closeness is a global measure of centrality in networks, and a proxy for how influential actors are in social networks. In most network models, and many empirical networks, closeness is strongly correlated with degree. However, in social…

Constituents of complex systems interact with each other and self-organize to form complex networks. Empirical results show that the link formation process of many real networks follows either the global principle of popularity or the local…

Human cooperation depends on indirect reciprocity. In this work, we explore the concept of indirect reciprocity using a donation game in an infinitely large population. In particular, we examine how updating the reputations of recipients…

Bribery in an election is one of the well-studied control problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we propose and study the safe bribery problem. Here the goal of the briber is to ask the bribed voters to vote in such a way…

Although most networks in nature exhibit complex topology the origins of such complexity remains unclear. We introduce a model of a growing network of interacting agents in which each new agent's membership to the network is determined by…