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We discuss a class of explicitly solvable mean field type control problems/mean field games with a clear economic interpretation. More precisely, we consider long term average impulse control problems with underlying general one-dimensional…
This paper proposes an iterative methodology to integrate large-scale behavioral activity-based models with dynamic traffic assignment models. The main novelty of the proposed approach is the decoupling of the two parts, allowing the…
We study the competitive equilibrium of large random economies with linear activities using methods of statistical mechanics. We focus on economies with $C$ commodities, $N$ firms, each running a randomly drawn linear technology, and one…
We model real-world data markets, where sellers post fixed prices and buyers are free to purchase from any set of sellers, as a simultaneous game. A key component here is the negative externality buyers induce on one another due to data…
This paper investigates the synthesis of distributed economic control algorithms under which dynamically coupled physical systems are regulated to a variational equilibrium of a constrained convex game. We study two complementary cases: (i)…
We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…
The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well…
This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…
Pricing algorithms have demonstrated the capability to learn tacit collusion that is largely unaddressed by current regulations. Their increasing use in markets, including oligopolistic industries with a history of collusion, calls for…
Machine learning models play a key role for service providers looking to gain market share in consumer markets. However, traditional learning approaches do not take into account the existence of additional providers, who compete with each…
Classic market design theory is rooted in static models where all participants trade simultaneously. In contrast, modern platform-mediated digital markets are fundamentally dynamic, defined by the asynchronous and stochastic arrival of…
The linear Fisher market (LFM) is a basic equilibrium model from economics, which also has applications in fair and efficient resource allocation. First-price pacing equilibrium (FPPE) is a model capturing budget-management mechanisms in…
General equilibrium is the dominant theoretical framework for economic policy analysis at the level of the whole economy. In practice, general equilibrium treats economies as being always in equilibrium, albeit in a sequence of equilibria…
Continuous-time primal-dual gradient dynamics (PDGD) is an ubiquitous approach for dynamically solving constrained distributed optimization problems. Yet, the distributed nature of the dynamics makes it prone to communication uncertainties,…
With the proliferation of distributed generations, traditional passive consumers in distribution networks are evolving into "prosumers", which can both produce and consume energy. Energy trading with the main grid or between prosumers is…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
We present a methodology to robustly estimate the competitive equilibria (CE) of combinatorial markets under the assumption that buyers do not know their precise valuations for bundles of goods, but instead can only provide noisy estimates.…
Scientific data, from cellular snapshots in biology to celestial distributions in cosmology, often consists of static patterns from underlying dynamical systems. These snapshots, while lacking temporal ordering, implicitly encode the…
Individuals are often influenced by the behavior of others, for instance because they wish to obtain the benefits of coordinated actions or infer otherwise inaccessible information. In such situations this social influence decreases the ex…