Related papers: Stochastic Linear Quadratic Stackelberg Differenti…
The focus of this paper is directed towards optimal control of multi-agent systems consisting of one leader and a number of followers in the presence of noise. The dynamics of every agent is assumed to be linear, and the performance index…
This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg…
We introduce a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit…
In competitive games with private objectives, actions can reveal information about hidden parameters. Quantifying such information revelation, however, is substantially more challenging, since it depends not only on the opponent's hidden…
In this paper, a partially observed stochastic linear Stackelberg differential game with mean-variance criteria is studied. Randomness comes from Brownian motions and Poisson random measures. which leads to a circular dependency. We follow…
In this paper, we first address a linear quadratic mean-field game problem with a leader-follower structure. By adopting a Riccati-type approach, we show how one can obtain a state-feedback representation of the pairs of strategies which…
Motivated by a product pricing problem, a linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game for a regime switching system involving one leader and two followers is studied. The two followers engage in a zero-sum differential game, and both the…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…
This paper is concerned with the linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control of continuous-time system with terminal state constraint. In particular, multiple agents exist in the system which can only access partial information of the matrix…
This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
In this paper, the two-player leader-follower game with private inputs for feedback Stackelberg strategy is considered. In particular, the follower shares its measurement information with the leader except its historical control inputs…
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game, where the systems are driven by stochastic differential equation (SDE for short), in which the control enters the randomly disturbed coefficients (drift and…
This paper investigates a linear quadratic mean field leader-follower team problem, where the model involves one leader and a large number of weakly-coupled interactive followers. The leader and the followers cooperate to optimize the…
This paper studies a class of partial information linear-quadratic mean-field game problems. A general stochastic large-population system is considered, where the diffusion term of the dynamic of each agent can depend on the state and…
This paper investigates a zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic (SLQ, for short) Stackelberg differential game problem, where the coefficients of the state equation and the weighting matrices in the performance functional are regulated by a…
In this paper, we investigate a class of nonzero-sum dynamic stochastic games, where players have linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions. The players are coupled in both dynamics and cost through a linear regression (weighted average)…
We consider a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic differential game. The time-inconsistency arises from the presence of quadratic terms of the expected state as well as state-dependent term in the objective functionals. We…