Related papers: Preference Cycles in Stable Matchings
This paper introduces a fundamental result, which is relevant for Answer Set programming, and planning. For the first time since the definition of the stable model semantics, the class of logic programs for which a stable model exists is…
In this paper, we begin by discussing different types of preference profiles related to the stable marriage problem. We then introduce the concept of soulmates, which are a man and a woman who rank each other first. Inversely, we examine…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
Given $n$ men, $n$ women, and $n$ dogs, we assume that each man has a complete preference list of women, while each woman does a complete preference list of dogs, and each dog does a complete preference list of men. We study the so-called…
A principled approach to cyclicality and intransitivity in paired comparison data is developed. The proposed methodology enables more precise estimation of the underlying preference profile and facilitates the identification of all cyclic…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
In this paper, we study the occurrence of patterns in the cycle structures of permutations.
We study control problems in the context of matching under preferences: We examine how a central authority, called the controller, can manipulate an instance of the Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates problems in order to achieve certain…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In the short run, individuals' subjective preferences influence partner selection and behavior in strategic interactions, which affect their material…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
The theme of this paper is the multiplicity of the consistent sets appearing in the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics. We propose one criterion for choosing preferred families among them: that the physically realizable…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…