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Games have always been a popular test bed for artificial intelligence techniques. Game developers are always in constant search for techniques that can automatically create computer games minimizing the developer's task. In this work we…
Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The Trust Game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential…
In this letter, we deal with evolutionary game theoretic learning processes for population games on networks with dynamically evolving communities. Specifically, we propose a novel mathematical framework in which a deterministic,…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…
We give a proof for the asymptotic exponential stability of equilibria of quasilinear parabolic evolution equations in admissible interpolation spaces.
We consider a walker that at each step keeps the same direction with a probabilitythat depends on the time already spent in the direction the walker is currently moving. In this paper, we study some asymptotic properties of this persistent…
Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some…
We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of…
In this paper, we obtain some stability results of (abstract) dissipative evolution equations with a nonautonomous and nonlinear damping using the exponential stability of the retrograde problem with a linear and autonomous feedback and a…
The value of a finite-state two-player zero-sum stochastic game with limit-average payoff can be approximated to within $\epsilon$ in time exponential in a polynomial in the size of the game times polynomial in logarithmic in…
We consider the permutation analogue of Penney's game for words. Two players, in order, each choose a permutation of length $k\ge3$; then a sequence of independent random values from a continuous distribution is generated, until the…
Crucial to an Evolutionary Algorithm's performance is its selection scheme. We mathematically investigate the relation between polynomial rank and probabilistic tournament methods which are (respectively) generalisations of the popular…
We present a model for evolving population which maintains genetic polymorphism. By introducing random mutation in the model population at a constant rate, we observe that the population does not become extinct but survives, keeping…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
We prove that an integrated simple random walk, where random walk and integrated random walk are conditioned to return to zero, has asymptotic probability $n^{-1/2}$ to stay positive. This question is motivated by so-called random polymer…
The Moran process is one of an basic mathematical structure in the evolutionary game theory. In this work, we introduce the formulation of the path integral approach for evolutionary game theory based on the Moran process. We derive the…
We find a two term asymptotic expansion for the optimal expected value of a sequentially selected monotone subsequence from a random permutation of length n. A striking feature of this expansion is that tells us that the expected value of…
We present a simple model of Texas hold'em poker tournaments which retains the two main aspects of the game: i. the minimal bet grows exponentially with time; ii. players have a finite probability to bet all their money. The distribution of…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-based learning (namely, perturbed learning automata) and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in repeatedly-played, positive-utility, finite strategic-form games. Prior work in this class of…
The paper is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behaviour of Moran process in random environment, say random selection. In finite population, the Moran process may be degenerate in finite time, thus we will study its limiting process in…