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We give a simple proof of the well-known result that the marginal strategies of a coarse correlated equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. A corollary of this fact is that no-external-regret learning algorithms…
In the study of reactive systems, qualitative properties are usually easier to model and analyze than quantitative properties. This is especially true in systems where mutually beneficial cooperation between agents is possible, such as…
This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…
Claude Shannon's zero-error communication paradigm reshaped our understanding of fault-tolerant information transfer. Here, we adapt this notion into game theory with incomplete information. We ask: can players with private information…
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…
In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…
The number of Nash equilibria of the mixed extension of a generic finite game in normal form is finite and odd. This raises the question how large the number can be, depending on the number of players and the numbers of their pure…
Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…
Since the seminal PPAD-completeness result for computing a Nash equilibrium even in two-player games, an important line of research has focused on relaxations achievable in polynomial time. In this paper, we consider the notion of…
We study what dataset assumption permits solving offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. In stark contrast to the offline single-agent Markov decision process, we show that the single strategy concentration assumption is insufficient for…
In this work, we provide a structural characterization of the possible Nash equilibria in the well-studied class of security games with additive utility. Our analysis yields a classification of possible equilibria into seven types and we…
Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a class of linear regular diffusions with not non-singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of It\^o and McKean (1974), p.\ 108). We provide sufficient conditions under…
The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version of the…
We provide a complete characterization for uniqueness of equilibria in unconstrained polymatrix games. We show that while uniqueness is natural for coordination and general polymatrix games, zero-sum games require that the dimension of the…
Computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-player non-zerosum stochastic games is a formidable challenge. Currently, algorithmic methods in stochastic game theory are unable to compute NE for stochastic games (SGs) for settings in all but…
This paper investigates the challenge of learning in black-box games, where the underlying utility function is unknown to any of the agents. While there is an extensive body of literature on the theoretical analysis of algorithms for…