Related papers: Minimal-time mean field games

In many stochastic games stemming from financial models, the environment evolves with latent factors and there may be common noise across agents' states. Two classic examples are: (i) multi-agent trading on electronic exchanges, and (ii)…

Mean-Field Games are games with a continuum of players that incorporate the time-dimension through a control-theoretic approach. Recently, simpler approaches relying on the Best Reply Strategy have been proposed. They assume that the agents…

Exploiting the efficiency and stability of Position-Based Dynamics (PBD), we introduce a novel crowd simulation method that runs at interactive rates for hundreds of thousands of agents. Our method enables the detailed modeling of per-agent…

Mean field games and controls involve guiding the behavior of large populations of interacting agents, where each individual's influence on the group is negligible but collectively impacts overall dynamics. Hybrid systems integrate…

We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…

The objective of this work is to study the existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibria in mean field games involving a major player and a continuum of minor players over finite intervals of arbitrary length. Following earlier…

In this paper we use a minimal model based on Mean-Field Games (a mathematical framework apt to describe situations where a large number of agents compete strategically) to simulate the scenario where a static dense human crowd is crossed…

An existence result for a class of mean field games of controls is provided. In the considered model, the cost functional to be minimized by each agent involves a price depending at a given time on the controls of all agents and a…

In this expository article, we give an overview of the concept of potential mean field games of first order. We give a new proof that minimizers of the potential are equilibria by using a Lagrangian formulation. We also provide criteria to…

In [14], Gueant, Lasry and Lions considered the model problem ``What time does meeting start?'' as a prototype for a general class of optimization problems with a continuum of players, called Mean Field Games problems. In this paper we…

Mean-field games (MFGs) are models for large populations of competing rational agents that seek to optimize a suitable functional. In the case of congestion, this functional takes into account the difficulty of moving in high-density areas.…

Here, we examine a mean-field game (MFG) that models the economic growth of a population of non-cooperative rational agents. In this MFG, agents are described by two state variables - the capital and consumer goods they own. Each agent…

Mean field games is a recent area of study introduced by Lions and Lasry in a series of seminal papers in 2006. Mean field games model situations of competition between large number of rational agents that play non-cooperative dynamic games…

Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…

We consider a class of systems of time dependent partial differential equations which arise in mean field type models with congestion. The systems couple a backward viscous Hamilton-Jacobi equation and a forward Kolmogorov equation both…

This paper studies a type of rank-based mean field game in which competing agents strategically switch among multiple effort regimes. We propose an entropy regularized auxiliary problem where the switching decisions are randomized to the…

We consider a mean-field control problem in which admissible controls are required to be adapted to the common noise filtration. The main objective is to show how the mean-field control problem can be approximates by time consistent…

This paper studies an optimal investment-consumption problem for competitive agents with exponential or power utilities and a common finite time horizon. Each agent regards the average of habit formation and wealth from all peers as…

This paper studies Mean Field Games (MFGs) in which agent dynamics are given by jump processes of controlled intensity, with mean-field interaction via the controls and affecting the jump intensities. We establish the existence of MFG…

We study the singular perturbation problem for mean field game systems with control of acceleration. For such a problem we analyze the behavior of solutions as the acceleration costs vanishes. In this setting the Hamiltonian fails to be…