Related papers: Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities
We consider Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions for a very general combinatorial structure, in an average-case setting where item costs are independent, identically distributed uniform random variables. We prove that the expected VCG cost…
Assuming the polynomial hierarchy is infinite, we prove a sufficient condition for determining if uniform and polynomial size quantum circuits over a non-universal gate set are not efficiently classically simulable in the weak…
Binary decision making classifiers are not fair by default. Fairness requirements are an additional element to the decision making rationale, which is typically driven by maximizing some utility function. In that sense, algorithmic fairness…
We give further support for our conjecture relating eigenvalue distributions of the Kapustin-Willett-Yaakov matrix model in the large N limit to numbers of operators in the chiral ring of the corresponding supersymmetric three-dimensional…
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) run protocol governance by letting token holders vote on proposals. The dominant rule, voting power proportional to wallet balance, concentrates control among a small number of large holders,…
The Leggett-Garg inequality attempts to classify experimental outcomes as arising from one of two possible classes of physical theories: those described by macrorealism (which obey our intuition about how the macroscopic classical world…
We investigate the cosmological implications of non-polynomial quasi-topological gravity (NPQTG), a novel class of modified gravitational theories in which the background dynamics is encoded in a single function of the Hubble parameter.…
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But how strong is the incentive to manipulate under different…
We consider the problem of maximizing expected utility from consumption in a constrained incomplete semimartingale market with a random endowment process, and establish a general existence and uniqueness result using techniques from convex…
The foundations of the Boltzmann-Gibbs (BG) distributions for describing equilibrium statistical mechanics of systems are examined. Broadly, they fall into: (i) probabilistic paaroaches based on the principle of equal a priori probability…
Submodular maximization with a cardinality constraint can model various problems, and those problems are often very large in practice. For the case where objective functions are monotone, many fast approximation algorithms have been…
We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms…
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…
This paper studies multi-object reallocation without monetary transfers, where agents initially own multiple indivisible objects and have strict preferences over bundles (e.g., shift exchange among workers at a firm). Focusing on marginal…
We address Stackelberg models of combinatorial congestion games (CCGs); we aim to optimize the parameters of CCGs so that the selfish behavior of non-atomic players attains desirable equilibria. This model is essential for designing such…
Gaussian measurements can not be used to witness nonlocality in Gaussian states as well as the network nonlocality in networks of continuous-variable (CV) systems. Thus special non-Gaussian measurements have to be utilized. In the present…
If a two-player social welfare maximization problem does not admit a PTAS, we prove that any maximal-in-range truthful mechanism that runs in polynomial time cannot achieve an approximation factor better than 1/2. Moreover, for the k-player…
The Random Utility Model (RUM) is the leading model to represent the aggregate choices of a heterogeneous population of preference maximizers. We show that if (and only if) preferences are sufficiently uncorrelated, RUM choices can also be…
In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…