Related papers: Popular Matching in Roommates Setting is NP-hard
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in $I$ is the exchange of two consecutive vertices in a preference list. A swap can be viewed as…
Two actively researched problem settings in matchings under preferences are popular matchings and the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. In this paper, we apply the optimality notion of the first topic to the…
Given a set $A$ of $n$ people and a set $B$ of $m \geq n$ items, with each person having a list that ranks his/her preferred items in order of preference, we want to match every person with a unique item. A matching $M$ is called popular if…
In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are given a set of applicants and a set of projects. Each applicant has a strictly ordered preference list over the projects, while the projects are equipped with a lower and…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and ranks on the edges denote preferences of the agents over posts. A matching M in G is rank-maximal if it matches the maximum number of…
Ordered matchings, defined as graphs with linearly ordered vertices, where each vertex is connected to exactly one edge, play a crucial role in the area of ordered graphs and their homomorphisms. Therefore, we consider related problems from…
In multistage perfect matching problems we are given a sequence of graphs on the same vertex set and asked to find a sequence of perfect matchings, corresponding to the sequence of graphs, such that consecutive matchings are as similar as…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…
Our objective is to develop an artificially intelligent system which aims at checking the compatibility between the roommates of same or different sex sharing a common area of residence. There are a few key factors determining one's…
We introduce a new -as far as we know- problem, according to which we are asked to match sequences of two digits in matrices having entries among those two digits (but others too) and prove that this problem is NP-complete
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. In this paper, we consider the stable roommates problem with ties. In particular, we focus on strong stability, which is one of the…
The Stable Roommates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SRTI) is a matching problem characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates, where the preferences may have ties or be incomplete. SRTI asks for a…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…