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We present new learning dynamics combining (independent) log-linear learning and value iteration for stochastic games within the auxiliary stage game framework. The dynamics presented provably attain the efficient equilibrium (also known as…
We present new learning dynamics combining (independent) log-linear learning and value iteration for stochastic games within the auxiliary stage game framework. The dynamics presented provably attain the efficient equilibrium (also known as…
As electrical generation becomes more distributed and volatile, and loads become more uncertain, controllability of distributed energy resources (DERs), regardless of their ownership status, will be necessary for grid reliability. Grid…
Renewable power sources have low marginal pro-duction costs, but may result in high balancing costs due to the inherent production uncertainty. Current day-ahead markets elicit only point production profiles and neglect the degree of…
This paper is concerned with the stochastic linear quadratic Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information, where the diffusion terms contain the control and state variables. Here the term "overlapping" means that there are…
This paper studies algorithmic decision-making under human's strategic behavior, where a decision maker uses an algorithm to make decisions about human agents, and the latter with information about the algorithm may exert effort…
Efficiency and reliability are both crucial for energy management, especially in multi-microgrid systems (MMSs) integrating intermittent and distributed renewable energy sources. This study investigates an economic and reliable energy…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a first order Markov process and is independent of the types of…
We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms…
We study a decentralized linear quadratic Gaussian control problem, in which a leader and a follower must steer a linear system to a target state. The target state is known only to the leader, and no explicit communication channel exists…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
In this paper, we address a key issue of designing architectures and algorithms which generate optimal demand response in a decentralized manner for a smart-grid consisting of several stochastic renewables and dynamic loads. By optimal…
The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is undergoing a transformative evolution, enabled by advancements in future 6G network technologies, to support intelligent, highly reliable, and low-latency vehicular services. However, the enhanced…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
The growing integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) into the power grid necessitates an effective coordination strategy to maximize their benefits. Acting as an aggregator of DERs, a virtual power plant (VPP) facilitates this…
We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problem motivated by the problem of $\textit{securities lending}$ in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short selling of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of…
This paper investigates a robust incentive Stackelberg stochastic differential game problem for a linear-quadratic mean field system, where the model uncertainty appears in the drift term of the leader's state equation. Moreover, both the…
Quantumgametheoryextendsclassical strategic decision-making by incorporating quantum superposition, entanglement, and measurement-induced randomness into competitive interactions. This paper introduces a team-based Quantum Sabotage Game…