Related papers: Computing and Testing Pareto Optimal Committees
A multicriteria economic problem is considered: the basic production assets and the labor resources define a set of feasible solutions (alternatives), labor costs, costs of the basic production assets (to be minimized), and cost of the…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item (PROP1) is an…
Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the…
In this work, we study the problem of finding Pareto optimal policies in multi-agent reinforcement learning problems with cooperative reward structures. We show that any algorithm where each agent only optimizes their reward is subject to…
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…
In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…
Sparse principal component analysis addresses the problem of finding a linear combination of the variables in a given data set with a sparse coefficients vector that maximizes the variability of the data. This model enhances the ability to…
We study the computational complexity of committee selection problem for several approval-based voting rules in the presence of outliers. Our first result shows that outlier consideration makes committee selection problem intractable for…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result…
We investigate the problem of computing a minimum set of solutions that approximates within a specified accuracy $\epsilon$ the Pareto curve of a multiobjective optimization problem. We show that for a broad class of bi-objective problems…
We consider multi-item exchange markets in which agents want to receive one of their target bundles of resources. The model encompasses well-studied markets for kidney exchange, lung exchange, and multi-organ exchange. We identify a general…
In order to represent the preferences of a group of individuals, we introduce Probabilistic CP-nets (PCP-nets). PCP-nets provide a compact language for representing probability distributions over preference orderings. We argue that they are…
There is a well known intrinsic trade-off between the fairness of a representation and the performance of classifiers derived from the representation. Due to the complexity of optimisation algorithms in most modern representation learning…
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
The Conditional Preference Network (CP-net) graphically represents user's qualitative and conditional preference statements under the ceteris paribus interpretation. The constrained CP-net is an extension of the CP-net, to a set of…
We propose a novel numerical approach to compute the Pareto front in multivariate polynomial multi-objective optimization problems. When the objective functions and (equality) constraints are multivariate polynomials, the Pareto front,…
Classification, recommendation, and ranking problems often involve competing goals with additional constraints (e.g., to satisfy fairness or diversity criteria). Such optimization problems are quite challenging, often involving non-convex…
We consider a model where an agent is must choose between alternatives that each provide only an imprecise description of the world (e.g. linguistic expressions). The set of alternatives is closed under logical conjunction and disjunction,…
We consider the problem of committee selection from a fixed set of candidates where each candidate has multiple quantifiable attributes. To select the best possible committee, instead of voting for a candidate, a voter is allowed to approve…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…